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Abstract: 
 
A methodology is developed and applied to compare the performance of publicly funded 
agencies providing treatment for alcohol abuse in Maine. The methodology estimates a 
Wiener process that determines the duration of completed treatments, while allowing for 
agency differences in the effectiveness of treatment, standards for completion of 
treatment, patient attrition, and the characteristics of patient populations. Notably, the 
Wiener process model separately identifies agency fixed effects that describe differences 
in the effectiveness of treatment ('treatment effects'), and effects that describe differences 
in the unobservable characteristics of patients ('population effects'). The estimated model 
enables hypothetical comparisons of how different agencies would treat the same 
populations. The policy experiment of transferring the treatment practices of more cost 
effective agencies suggests that Maine could have significantly reduced treatment costs 
without compromising health outcomes by identifying and transferring best practices. 
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11 Introduction
Relative performance evaluations provide incentives to workers and managers, identify best
practices in organizations, and inform resource allocation decisions. In light of these mer-
its, the neglected problem of implementing meaningful relative performance measurements is
important. In this paper, we address the practical problem of comparing the performance of
similar activities that are not directly comparable. Our speci…c application is the provision
of alcohol-abuse treatment in the state of Maine (USA). Essentially, we develop a method-
ology for “benchmarking” the performance of these health service providers, and apply this
methodology to estimate potential e¢ciency gains from identifying and transferring “best
practices”.
As a general motivation for our analysis, consider the following stylized problem. Suppose
a decision-maker is interested in comparing the cost-e¤ectiveness of N independent service
units. The decision-maker observes costs and an output measure for each unit. However, the
naive use of these data to compare productivities is problematic because the units produce
di¤erentiated services. Such di¢culties of relative performance evaluation are particularly
apparent for health care services. First, the activities of the service units may not be
directly comparable because each is treating a di¤erent patient population. A unit may
perform worse simply because of a more di¢cult case load. Second, the service units may be
hard to compare because their activities di¤er in quality. For example, the outcome measure
might be a measure of morbidity immediately following a hospital procedure. The discharged
patients of a hospital with low measured morbidity might su¤er future complications or have
low survival rates. Under circumstances like these, how can the decision-maker meaningfully
compare the performance of the N service units?
2We confront the real life di¢culties of comparing the performance of publicly-funded
substance abuse treatment providers in the state of Maine in the United States. Maine’s
O¢ce of Substance Abuse (OSA) in the 1980’s and 90’s allocated public funds to quali…ed
substance-abuse treatment programs. OSA thought that some of these programs might be
better than others at remedying drug and alcohol abuse, and collected data in order to
measure and compare their performance. The inputs used in treatment and the costs of
providing treatment were relatively easy to monitor, but the outputs of the treatment agen-
cies were di¢cult to measure directly and di¢cult even to de…ne precisely. Adding to this
di¢culty, the agencies treated populations living in di¤erent parts of the state. Although
OSA measured characteristics of these di¤erent patient populations, it is likely that there is
important unmeasured heterogeneity in these populations. We develop and apply a method-
ology for comparing the performance of the di¤erent agencies treating di¤erent populations.
The methodology is based on a model of the treatment processes that is designed to exploit
the information contained in multiple outcome measures. The outcome measures are time
in treatment, completion of treatment, and alcohol use at completion.
To illustrate some of the issues that our methodology addresses, consider Figure 1. The
…gure shows the percentage of admitted patients that successfully completed treatment in
each of the 12 months after admission for three treatment agencies. These completion den-
sities are very di¤erent. For Agency A, the density peaks at 3 months, for B at 6 months,
and for C at 8 months. Moreover, patients in A and C were noticeably more likely to
complete treatment within twelve months than those at B. There are several possible expla-
nations for A’s apparently superior performance. First, A might provide superior treatment,
leading to a higher probability of completion compared to B or quicker success compared
3Figure 1: Sample Completion Densities
to C. Similarly, A might use more intense and therefore more costly treatment to achieve
the better outcomes, e.g. provide patients more hours of treatment per week. Third, A’s
patients might enter treatment with less severe a­ictions than patients at B and C. Lastly,
A might have less stringent clinical standards for the completion of treatment. Obviously
these di¤erent explanations have di¤erent implications for comparing the cost-e¤ectiveness
of the agencies.
To distinguish these alternative explanations empirically, we model a production process
for a health treatment with the following general properties: (1) production takes time;
(2) production is uncertain; (3) production occurs under varying exogenous conditions; (4)
output is not perfectly observable. More speci…cally, we model the health treatment process
as illustrated in Figure 2: a patient enters a treatment program with an initial (scalar-valued)
health status (h0), health status evolves stochastically through time in response to treatment
4time
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Figure 2: Health care treatment process
(ht), and treatment is completed when the patient’s health status crosses an upper threshold
(h). We model the evolution of ht as a Wiener process, and completion of treatment as the
…rst crossing of the barrier ¹h. As a result, the time it takes to complete treatment has an
Inverse Gaussian distribution.
In order to deal with the measurement problems outlined above, our empirical implemen-
tation of the model allows that: (a) di¤erent treatment programs di¤er in their e¤ectiveness
at improving health status; (b) di¤erent programs have di¤erent populations of patients
entering treatment (both with regard to observables and econometric unobservables); and
(c) di¤erent programs have di¤erent thresholds for the completion of treatment. The em-
pirical model also controls for the fact that some patients exit treatment prematurely, and
allows the rate of attrition to vary from program to program. Our estimation methodology
is maximum likelihood, using the Inverse Gaussian distribution for the time to completion
5of treatment.1 Health status is not directly observable, although the data set includes indi-
cators of health status at admission and discharge. We are careful to control for possible
unobserved heterogeneity and to distinguish “treatment e¤ects” from unobserved population
characteristics.
Our model is estimated with data drawn from an admission-discharge data set for patients
receiving outpatient treatment for alcohol abuse provided by publicly-funded agencies in the
state of Maine. This is the data that OSA collected to inform its budget allocation problem.
The data set matches patients to treatment agencies. Our analysis indicate that these
agencies di¤er substantially not only in their ability to improve the health of alcohol abusers,
but also in their completion thresholds, the initial health of their patient populations, and
their ability to retain patients until completion of treatment. The estimated model enables
us to simulate the improvement in the health status of any population of patients in any
treatment program. We also separately estimate an equation predicting the quantity of
treatment patients would receive at di¤erent agencies, combine this with unit cost data
drawn from the contracts between the treatment agencies and OSA, and thereby predict the
total cost of treating any population of patients in any treatment program. Our results show
signi…cant di¤erences in the estimated productivities, i.e. the improvement of health per
dollar spent, of the di¤erent treatment agencies, suggesting the possibility of e¢ciency gains
if the less productive agencies were to adopt the “technologies” (e.g. practice styles and
management techniques) of the more e¢cient ones. In practice, such a technology transfer
might be accomplished by mergers, information exchange, or training.
We estimate that a transfer of best practices could reduce treatment costs signi…cantly
1See Lancaster (1990) for a discussion of the Wiener process as a duration model.
6without compromising health outcomes. The nature of our policy experiments is illustrated
in Table 1, which presents estimates (based on our estimated model) of how Maine could
reduce expenditures while not reducing the number of abstinent discharged patients. For
example, by transferring the practice style of Agency 6 to Agency 13’s patient population,
Maine could save a signi…cant $63,260 (standard error in parentheses), and by transferring
the practice style of Agency 12 to Agency 15’s population, another $29,091. The total of
such pro…table transfers comes to $203,752, which is 9.27% of the budget of the top …fteen
publicly funded agencies.
The recent literature on treatment e¤ects has emphasized non-parametric or semi-parametric
estimation to obtain robust conclusions (Manksi, 1996), and instrumental variables to control
for endogenous selection (Imbens and Angrist (1994), Heckman (1997)). In our empirical
context, good instruments to control for unobserved patient heterogeneity are not readily
available. Therefore, we follow the structural literature (e.g. Olley and Pakes (1996), Keane
and Wolpin (1997), and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999)) by specifying a model that identi…es
the parameters of interest. As detailed later, the key identi…cation restrictions arise very
naturally in our model of the treatment process. Our methodology is most related to that of
Olley and Pakes (1996) who impose reasonable covariance restrictions to estimate a produc-
tion function with endogenous inputs. In our case, an “endogeneity problem” arises because
unobserved patient characteristics might be correlated with patients’ assignments to treat-
ment agencies.2 In the same spirit as Olley and Pakes (1996), we exploit data on alcohol use
at admission to help control for the resulting endogeneity problem. Finally, our parametric
model has the bene…t of enabling strong predictions from policy simulations, in particular
the “transfer of best practices” policy experiment mentioned above.
2We also …nd direct evidence that patient populations di¤er in their unobserved characteristics.
7Controlling for Unobservable Population E¤ects
Population of Treated by Cumulative Cumulative
Agency Agency $ Savings $ Savings % Savings
13 6 63259:59
63259:59
(11115:76)
0:0288
(0:0049)
15 12 29091:40
92350:99
(14170:04)
0:0420
(0:0063)
7 6 27515:10
119866:09
(21630:42)
0:0546
(0:0097)
10 4 26500:25
146366:34
(27846:17)
0:0666
(0:0126)
3 4 19480:57
165846:91
(44810:56)
0:0755
(0:0205)
14 12 16635:7
182482:61
(45690:58)
0:0831
(0:0209)
8 4 8958:95
191441:56
(80298:50)
0:0871
(0:0367)
11 12 6724:75
198166:31
(81374:71)
0:0902
(0:0372)
9 4 3368:79
201535:10
(83680:47)
0:0917
(0:0382)
1 2 2217:06
203752:16
(82687:48)
0:0927
(0:0378)
6 6 0
203752:16
(82687:48)
0:0927
(0:0378)
5 5 0
203752:16
(82687:48)
0:0927
(0:0378)
4 4 0
203752:16
(82687:48)
0:0927
(0:0378)
12 12 0
203752:16
(82687:48)
0:0927
(0:0378)
2 2 0
203752:16
(82687:48)
0:0927
(0:0378)
Table 1: Cost reducing technology transfers, controlling for population e¤ects in terms of
abstinence
8The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our basic model of the
treatment process, and outlines our estimation methodology. Section 3 describes the data
set to which we apply the model; Section 4 discusses the estimated model, applies the model
to compare the performance of di¤erent treatment agencies and estimates the potential gains
from transferring “best practices.” Section 5 concludes and outlines some possible directions
for further research. The appendix discusses additional estimation and simulation results
and the health services literature on the e¤ectiveness of substance abuse treatment.
2 Model and estimation strategy
2.1 Time in treatment and health improvement
Consider the following model of health care treatment. A patient i enters treatment with
an initial health status hi0. Once in treatment, the patient’s health status, hit, evolves
stochastically according to a Wiener process with drift ¹i and variance ¾
2. If hit crosses an
upper threshold, hi, then the patient is deemed to have completed treatment successfully.
It follows from the distribution theory for Wiener processes that the cumulative probability
distribution of completion times for patient i is the Inverse Gaussian distribution,
F (ti;¹i; ¾;¢hi) = 1¡ ©(
¢hi ¡ ¹it
¾
p
t
) + e
2¹i¢hi
¾2 ©(
¡¢hi ¡ ¹it
¾
p
t
) (1)
where ¢hi = hi ¡ hi0 is the total change in health necessary for completion, and ©(²) is
the cumulative normal distribution. A simple estimation strategy would be to …t time until
completion of treatment (ti) to the Inverse Gaussian distribution function by estimating ¹i,
¾, and ¢hi as parametric functions of patient characteristics.
A problem with this simple approach is that some patients drop out of treatment before
9completion. This is problematic because patient attrition is potentially a source of selection
bias. For example, if less healthy patients are more likely to drop out before completion
of treatment, then those agencies with a “slower” treatment process will have a healthier
population of patients who complete treatment. One way to control for patient selection is as
follows.3 If ¸i(t) is patient i’s time-varying exogenous dropout hazard, then the distribution
of dropout times for patient i is:
G(ti;¸i(¢)) = 1¡ e¡
R ti
0 ¸i(s)ds: (2)
Therefore, if ci is a dummy variable indicating whether the patient has completed treatment,
rather than exiting prematurely, and ti is the patient’s time in treatment, then the likelihood
function for (ci; ti) is
ff(ti;¹i; ¾;¢hi)[1¡G(ti;¸i(¢))]gci £ fg(ti;¸i(¢))[1¡ F (ti;¹i; ¾;¢hi]g1¡ci (3)
where f(¢) and g(¢) are the density functions derived from F (¢) and G(¢), respectively. An
empirical implementation of this model might specify ¹i; ¾; ¸i; and ¢hi as parametric func-
tions of patient characteristics and estimate the parameters by maximizing the likelihood
function. This strategy controls for patient attrition by exploiting two outcome measures:
completion of treatment (ci) and time in treatment.(ti).4
A limitation of this more sophisticated model is that it does not separately identify the
two components of ¢hi = hi ¡ hi0, and therefore cannot distinguish whether a treatment
program has a higher completion threshold (hi) or a healthier population at admission (hi0).
3For di¤erent views on how to deal with dropouts in the substance abuse literature see, for example,
Anglin and Hser (1990), Apsler (1991), Apsler and Harding (1991), Ball and Ross (1991), and the Gerstein
and Hardwood (1990).
4A possibility for further research is to endogenize a patient’s exit decision. For example, a patient’s
decision to leave treatment before completion might be triggered by a disappointing evolution of health
status while in treatment.
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Separate identi…cation of these di¤erences is possible if the model is augmented to incorpo-
rate additional outcome measures. Assume that there are measures of health observed at
admission to treatment and at completion of treatment: qi0 is observed at admission and
­i0(qi0jhi0) is the probability of qi0 conditional on hi0; similarly, qi is observed if the patient
completes treatment (ci = 1),5 and ­i(qijqi0; hi; hi0) is the conditional probability of qi given
(qi0; hi; hi0). Then the likelihood function for (ci; ti; qi0; qi) is
ff(ti;¹i; ¾;¢hi)[1¡G(ti;¸i(¢))]gci £ fg(t;¸i(¢))[1¡ F (ti;¹i; ¾;¢hi]g1¡ci £
­i0(qi0jhi0)£ ¹­i(qijqi0;hi; hi0)ci (4)
Taking logs and summing over patients gives the log likelihood function for the sample of
patients under the assumption of independent likelihood functions across patients.
Our estimation strategy for the augmented model is to specify hi0, hi, ¹i, ¸i(t), ­i0(qi0jhi0),
and ¹­i(qijqi0; hi; hi0) as functions of the data, substitute these functions into the sample log
likelihood function, and maximize the resulting function to obtain parameter estimates. Im-
portantly, we allow for an unobserved patient characteristic µi. Let a patient’s initial health
be a linear function of patient characteristics observed by the econometrician (vector Xi)
and an unobserved characteristic (µi), i.e.
hi0 = ®0Xi + µi (5)
Let Aij denote a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if patient i is assigned to program
j (= 1; :::J), and equal to 0 otherwise, and Ai the vector of these dummy variables for
patient i. We specify the drift, threshold, and log dropout hazard as linear functions of these
5As is often the case, we have less reliable information on the status of patients who drop out of treatment
than for those who complete treatment.
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variables:
¹i = ±0Xi + ±1Ai + ±2µi (6)
hi = ¯0Xi + ¯1Ai + ¯2µi (7)
ln¸i(t) = °0Xi + °1Ai + °2µi + °3t (8)
The agency dummies Ai enter these three equations directly. We refer to the coe¢cients
on these dummies as “treatment e¤ects,” and interpret them as capturing di¤erences in
practice style across agencies that result in a di¤erent treatment process. This is a quasi-
reduced form approach to estimating treatment e¤ects in the sense that we are not modelling
the underlying decisions that determine these e¤ects. For example, a particular agency might
have a higher than normal drift rate because the agency’s practice style is to treat patients
more intensely (e.g. schedule more hours of treatment per week). Perhaps the same agency
also has higher attrition rates due to the more demanding schedule.6 Importantly, Ai does
not directly enter the hi0 equation. The reason is clear: hi0 is a variable determined prior to
the treatment process and by de…nition not subject to treatment e¤ects of the agencies.
If patients were assigned randomly to agencies, then we could treat µi as an unobservable
independent of Ai and estimate the treatment e¤ects (±1; ¯1; °1). However, since this is not
an experimental setting, it seems presumptuous to assume that µi is uncorrelated with Ai.7
6Later, we relate agency performance to a few characteristics of the agency. An alternative approach
would be to incorporate key agency characteristics directly into the model in lieu of the treatment e¤ect
dummies.
7In our alcohol abuse treatment setting, this correlation could arise because agency assignment is pri-
marily based on where patients live and patients characteristics might vary geographically. In fact, observed
characteristics Xi are clearly correlated with Ai in our data. As such, it is likely that the unobserved µi is
correlated with Ai.
There are also other possible reasons for correlation between Ai and µi. For example, it is conceivable
that some treatment agencies selectively admit patients based on hi0. Our model may not perfectly capture
selection where patients are accepted or rejected based on hi0, since in this case the distribution of µi
conditional on Ai and Xi might be truncated. However, we should pick up the mean e¤ect of such selection
in our ®1.
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Accordingly, we assume that the conditional distribution of µi given Ai and Xi is normal
with mean ¼1Xi + ®1Ai, i.e.
µi = ¼1Xi + ®1Ai + "i (9)
where "i » N(0; 1):8 Substituting (9) into (5) - (8) we obtain
hi0 = ®0Xi + ®1Ai + "i (10)
¹i = ±0Xi + (±1 + ±2®1)Ai + ±2"i (11)
hi = ¯0Xi + (¯1 + ¯2®1)Ai + ¯2"i (12)
ln¸i(t) = °0Xi + (°1 + °2®1)Ai + °2"i + °3t (13)
where the coe¢cients on Xi have been rede…ned to include ¼1:9
Examining (11)-(13), note that there are two e¤ects of Ai on each of ¹i, hi and ¸i. The
…rst e¤ect (e.g. the J-vector ±1 in (11)) is the “treatment e¤ect” - an attribute of the agency
providing treatment to patient i. The second e¤ect (e.g. the scalar ±2 times the J-vector
®1) is the “population e¤ect” - capturing the fact that a particular agency has patients with
higher or lower values of the unobservable characteristic.
Separating these treatment e¤ects and population e¤ects is very important for our goal
of comparing performances of di¤erent treatment agencies. We want to “rank” agencies
based on the e¤ectiveness of their treatment program (i.e. their treatment e¤ects), and not
8Setting the variance of "i equal to unity is inoquous because health is a latent variable as it will become
clear shortly. Hence, since hi0 is only “observed” through ordered variables representing frequency of alcohol
use, we need to make this normalization to de…ne what a “unit of health” is. Note that we are also currently
assuming that the "i is homoscedastic, i.e. its variance does not depend on (Xi;Ai).
9Precisely, the transformations are ®0 = ®0 + ¼1; ±0 = ±0 + ±2¼1; ¯0 = ¯0 + ¯2¼1, and °0 = °0 + °2¼1.
This simply emphasizes that we cannot separate the direct e¤ect of a particular Xi characteristic and the
e¤ect through that characteristic’s correlation with the unobserved characteristic. This lack of identi…cation
muddies the interpretation of the coe¢cients on Xi:
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based on whether they happen to admit patients that are unobservably easier or harder to
treat (i.e. their population e¤ects). Importantly, these treatment and population e¤ects are
separately identi…ed because, by de…nition, hi0 does not depend on a treatment e¤ect. The
observed e¤ect of Ai on hi0 gives us a pure view on the population e¤ect which can then be
“netted” out of the other equations.
Moving to our indicators of health at admission and completion, let qi0 and qi be cate-
gorical variables with M + 1 possible integer values, indexed m = 0; :::M . We assume that
qi0 and qi are related to hi0 and hi through an ordered probit structure. More speci…cally,
qi0 = M i¤ hi0 + ´i0 < ÃM (14)
= m i¤ Ãm+1 · hi0 + ´i0 < Ãm, for m = 1; :::M ¡ 1
= 0 otherwise
qi = M i¤ hi + ´i < ÃM (15)
= m i¤ Ãm+1 · hi + ´i < Ãm, for m = 1; :::M ¡ 1
= 0 otherwise
where µ
´i0
´i
¶
» N
µ
0;
·
¾2´ ¾0T
¾0T ¾
2
´
¸¶
(16)
i.e., the unobservables ´i0 and ´i are distributed joint normal with common variance ¾
2
´ and
with covariance ¾0T .10
Conditional on hi0, hi, ¹i, and ¸i(t), the likelihood function for patient i is given by
10This bivariate normal distribution de…nes ­i0(qi0jhi0), and ¹­i(qijqi0; hi; hi0) in (4). In actual computa-
tion of the likelihood function it is easier to work directly with the joint distribution ­i(qi; qi0jhi; hi0). The
equality of the variance terms is a simpli…cation.
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the “analytically” computable11 equation (4) above. However, hi0, hi, ¹i, and ¸i(t) are
unobserved as they depend on the unobserved characteristic "i. To compute the likelihood,
it is necessary to integrate (4) over the distribution of "i. As there is no analytic solution for
this one-dimensional integral, we simulate it.12 Maximization of the simulated log likelihood
function returns estimates for (®;¯;°; ±;Ã; ¾; ¾2´; ¾0T ) using data (ci; ti; qi0; qi;Xi;Ai) for a
sample of patients i = 1; :::n.
Several clari…cations and caveats about the model are in order. First, the four separate
sets of coe¢cients on Xi and Ai (®;¯;°; and ±) are identi…ed by the four endogenous
variables. The coe¢cients in hi0 are pinned down by the observed indicators of initial health,
qi0. Likewise, the coe¢cients in hi are identi…ed from the observed indicators of …nal health
qi. The coe¢cients in ¹i and ¸i(t) are jointly identi…ed by the completion (ci) and time in
treatment (ti) data. Increases in ¸i(t) decrease the probability of completion. Increases in
¹i increase the probability of completion and decrease the expected time until completion
(conditional on completion).13 Second,Xi and µi do not enter the ordered probit relationship
between the h’s and the q’s. This is a necessary normalization because coe¢cients on Xi in
the q equations would not be identi…ed separately from those in the equations for hi0 and
hi. The coe¢cients in hi0 and hi must be interpreted accordingly.14 Third, we suppose that
11­i(qi; qi0jhi; hi0) is computed numerically using highly accurate bivariate normal CDFs.
12We use an 11-point discretized normal approximation to the distribution of "i.
13We expect that even more elaborate models can be estimated satisfactorily. For example, consider
allowing Xi and Ai to a¤ect the variance of the Wiener process (¾2). These e¤ects are separately identi…ed
because a change in ¾2 has a di¤erent e¤ect on the variance of time until completion than does a change in
¹i.
14As described in more detail later, qi0 and qi are measures of frequency of alcohol consumption (e.g.
once a month, once a week, etc.). Patient characteristics might enter the relationship between h and q if
the relation between health and how much one drinks is di¤erent for di¤erent patients. Importantly, the
potential inclusion of µi in the relationship between hi0 and qi0 does not hinder our separate identi…cation of
population e¤ects and treatment e¤ects. On the other hand, the restriction that Ai does not directly (it can
indirectly enter through µi ) enter this relationship is crucial for this separate identi…cation of population and
treatment e¤ects. Without this restriction, this implicit normalization would contradict our interpretation
of the agency e¤ect in the equation for hi0 as a pure “population e¤ect.” We think this is a reasonable
15
the health indicator at discharge, qi, is observed only if the patient completes treatment.
15
Fourth, we measure time in treatment in weeks, and aggregate the likelihoods accordingly.
Fifth, when we discuss the data in the next section, we will modify our model slightly to
account for patients who are still in treatment at the end of the sample period and to better
account for the empirical time pattern of attrition.
Beside providing a concise and realistic framework for combining information from multi-
ple endogenous outcomes (ci; ti; qi0; qi), our structural model solves the endogeneity problem
resulting from a potential correlation between the vector of agency dummies Ai and the un-
observed characteristic "i. This solution relies on two key assumptions. First, as discussed
above, the dependent variable qi0 is free of treatment e¤ects. This allows us to estimate
relative population e¤ects from the qi0 equation. Second, unobserved patient characteristics
are summarized by a scalar.16 This allows us to assess the contribution of the population
e¤ects to each dependent variable by conditional covariances of the four variables.17;18
restriction because q is an objective measure of a patient’s condition.
15We do have some data on health status at discharge for non-completors. We are concerned, however,
about its reliability and are not using it in estimation.
16While this scalar restriction is signi…cant, it should capture the …rst order e¤ects of unobserved charac-
teristics and is certainly preferrable to ignoring unobserved characteristics completely.
17Slightly more formally, we have four dependent variables (ci; ti; qi0; qi). There are …ve unobservables in
the model: the Wiener process, the dropout process, the two error terms in the relation between hi0 (hi) and
qi0 (qi), and the unobserved patient characteristics. These unobservables are assumed uncorrelated except for
correlation between the two unobservables in the q¡h relationship. Thus, there are three variances (variances
of the unobservable characteristic (") and the dropout process are normalized to 1), one covariance, and three
parameters (±2; ¯2 and °2) to be identi…ed by conditional covariances of the four dependent variables. The
eight free elements (two variances must be normalized due to discreteness) in this four by four conditional
covariance matrix appear to be su¢cient to identify these seven parameters. Thus, identi…cation of the
model (ignoring selection issues - see next footnote), comes from conditional means and variances rather
than higher order distributional assumptions.
18While the argument in the previous footnote suggests that identi…cation of our basic model comes from
means and variances and doesn’t rely on precise functional forms for our distributions, there are two data
problems in our particular application that do bring distributional issues into the identi…cation picture. First,
as is standard in discrete choice models, the discreteness of qi0 and qi requires distributional assumptions
that do a¤ect identi…cation. An additional issue arises because we only observe qi for completors. This
generates a selection problem. Our model implicitly deals with this selection problem in a Heckman-like
correction. As is usually the case in these selection models, it is likely that the correction does depend on
16
Importantly, this endogeneity issue in our data set would be very hard to deal with in less
structural models. The standard approach would look for instruments that were correlated
with agency assignment yet uncorrelated with unobserved patient characteristics.19 It is
hard to imagine such instruments existing if the endogeneity is due to inherent di¤erences
in patient populations across regions and treatment agencies have di¤erent geographical
footprints.20
There is also a second possible “endogeneity” problem arising from the fact that “time
in treatment” (ti) and “health improvement” (4hi) are determined simultaneously. To
illustrate the problem, consider the hypothetical question: “If a patient were required to
stay in treatment an extra week, what would be the expected increase in the patient’s
health?”21 One way to answer this question is to estimate a causal “production function”,
e.g.
4hi = ¹ti + ¯Xi +$Ai + & i (17)
where changes in health are caused by time in treatment. A primary problem in this ap-
proach is that the unobservables & i may be correlated with ti. Intuitively, patients that are
the distributional assumptions in the model (e.g. the normality of the unobserved patient characteristics
and the Wiener process).
19This discussion highlights two general approaches to deal with endogeneity. The …rst and most common
approach is instrumental variables. The second approach, taken here and following Olley and Pakes (1996), is
to use auxiliary equations/data to, in essence, “observe” the unobservables causing the endogeneity problem.
20More precisely, suppose, for example, that agency assignment is purely regional, e.g. one goes to the
closest agency. Suppose also that there are unobservable di¤erences in patient populations across regions
(our empirical results suggest that this is true). Then there would be literally no possible instruments for
the endogenous agency assignment. Moreover, even if there were other determinants of agency assigment
they may not be feasible instruments. For example, agency budgets may be perceived as good candidates
for instrumenting agency assigment. There are, however, at least two reasons to discard them. First, one
might expect the budget to a¤ect agency decisions on drift and thresholds, in which case they would not be
su¢cient to control for the endogeneity. Second, OSA may have information about the unobservable patient
characteristics and incorporate them in their budget allocation decision, implying correlation between budget
and ".
21Or perhaps, “if we wanted to increase health to a given level, how long would the patient likely have to
stay?”
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more easily treated take less time to complete treatment due to unobservable characteristics
that matter for the treatment process. A standard approach to this endogeneity problem
is to identify excluded variables that serve as instruments for ti:22 In contrast to the usual
instrumental variables approach based on exclusion restrictions, our structural model con-
sistently estimates the health production function based on restrictions that arise naturally
from the assumed treatment process. In particular, the assumption that health improve-
ments accrue over time restricts how the variables a¤ecting the drift of the Wiener process
interact with time in treatment.23
2.2 Quantity of treatment
We predict the total cost of treatment for various patient populations in various agencies
with a separate estimation procedure. Given data on agency costs per unit of treatment, a
model of the number of units of treatment provided to a patient is su¢cient to estimate the
cost of treatment. We assume that the units of treatment24 individual i receives, ui, is given
22The unobservability of 4hi might be dealt with by replacing it with an observable proxy for health
improvement (e.g. reduction in use, qi ¡ qi0) and estimate a probit or logit type model. Lu and McGuire
(2001) employ an approach like this, using the same data set as we do. They use both “units of treatment”
and “time in treatment” as explanatory variables and agency revenue sources as instruments to control for
the endogeneity of these variables. They do not explicitly address the endogeneity of agency assignment and,
therefore, do not separately identify population from treatment e¤ects.
23According to our Wiener process model, the production function is:
4hi = ¹iti + vi = (±0Xi + ±1Ai + ±2µi)ti + vi
= ±0Xiti + (±1 + ±2®1)Aiti + ±2"iti + vi:
This means that if we could observe 4hi then we would get consistent estimates by dividing through by
t and using OLS, or, alternatively, by using X and A as instruments for Xt and At, respectively. Note,
however, that this simple approach does not separately identify population from treatment e¤ects.
24In expressing the total units a patient receives in individual therapy units we assume that one unit of
group therapy is equivalent to wg units of individual therapy where wg is the ratio between group therapy
unit costs and individual treatment unit costs. Similarly, one unit of family therapy is equivalent to wf units
of individual therapy where wf is the ratio between family therapy unit costs and individual treatment unit
costs. The left hand side variable is therefore decomposed as follows, where lower case are the actual number
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by:
lnui = »0 + »1Xi + »2Ai + »3µi + {i (18)
= »0 + »1Xi + (»2 + »3®1)Ai + »3"i + {i (19)
where25 {i is an unobservable term and »2 is a vector of agency treatment e¤ects. {i is natu-
rally correlated with the unobservables governing the treatment process and/or the dropout
process. For example, patients that drop out prematurely will also tend to receive less
treatment. We can easily obtain the coe¢cients »1 and (»2 + »3®1) with an OLS regression,
but this does not separately identify the treatment e¤ect »2 and the population e¤ect »3®1.
This is unsatisfactory for our purposes. As in the other parts of our model, when we per-
form the conceptual experiment of moving patients into a di¤erent treatment program, the
population e¤ect should be held constant while the treatment e¤ect should change.
We adopt the following approach to identifying the treatment and population e¤ects for
the units equation. From the estimated treatment model we recover a posterior mean for the
unobservable characteristic "i for each patient i in the sample. This posterior is computed
conditional on the estimated parameters b¯; the exogenous data Xi and Ai, and the observed
frequency of use at admission qi0. Call this posterior bpi. Since by de…nition
E["ijXi; Ai; qi0; b¯] = bpi (20)
it follows that:
"i = bpi + 'i (21)
of patient units received by patient i as reported in the MATS discharge form:
lnui = ln(uii +wg £ uig +wf £ uif ):
25Again we have rede…ned the coe¢cients on Xi to include potential correlation between observed and
unobserved characteristics:
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where 'i is mean independent of Xi; Ai, and bpi. Substituting this expression for "i into the
units equations yields the estimating equation:
lnui = »0 + »1Xi + (»2 + »3®1)Ai + »3bpi + »3'i + {i (22)
By treating bpi as data, it is possible to estimate (»2+ »3®1) and »3 by OLS, and then use the
estimates of ®1 from section 4 to calculate the treatment e¤ects »2 in the units equation.
In this procedure, it is important to compute the posterior mean for "i by conditioning
only on the initial condition qi0 and not on the endogenous variables (ci; ti; qi). The reason
is that {i likely is correlated with these endogenous variables because of correlation with the
unobservables in the treatment and dropout processes (e.g. random missed appointments
both decrease units of treatment and slow health improvement). There is not a similar
problem with conditioning on qi0 because this variable is determined prior to the treatment
process. Thus, when we only condition on qi0, it is reasonable to assume that pi is uncorrelated
with {i.
An issue that arises when we estimate the units equation separately from the production
function is that we do not directly estimate covariances between estimated parameters of the
production process and the parameters in the units equation. These covariances are nec-
essary for obtaining standard errors on productivities and the results of our policy analyses
that follow. To obtain these covariances, we bootstrap the estimation routine on resampled
data sets and compute the covariances of the parameters across the bootstraps.26
26This procedure is less burdensome computationally than the alternative procedure of estimating the
units equation simultaneously with the rest of the model.
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3 The data
We apply our framework to treatment for alcohol abuse. Our primary data source is the
Maine Addiction and Treatment System (MATS). The data describes people receiving out-
patient treatment for alcohol abuse in the State of Maine (U.S.A.) between October 1990 and
June 1996. Maine is mostly rural – in 1994, 35.9% of the population lived in metropolitan
areas compared to 79.8% nationally.27 Parts of the state are particularly remote. Substance
abuse, and especially alcohol abuse, appears to be a serious problem in the state. Almost one
percent of the population receives treatment in state funded substance abuse programs,28
and for 87% of the adults who receive treatment, alcohol is the primary abused substance.29
State government funding for substance abuse treatment was in the neighborhood of $10
million in 1995,30 or about $8 per capita.31
MATS collects data on patients receiving treatment from any publicly funded substance
abuse treatment agency in the state. MATS agencies were required to complete standardized
admission and discharge forms for every treated patient, and to report this data to the
state regulatory agency (OSA).32 Our analysis focuses on the …fteen largest publicly funded
substance abuse agencies, who had a combined budget of $6; 439; 312 in …scal year 1994 of
which $4; 594; 595 was budgeted for outpatient treatment alone.33 Our treatment provider
27Data are from the census website: http://www.census.gov/statab/www/states/me.txt.
28Source: Maine’s application for the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health block grants in FY 1992
29Source: Maine OSA Fact Sheet, “Alcohol Use in Maine,” 1997.
30The total budegeted expenditures of the O¢ce of Substance Abuse was $10,085,716. Source: State of
Maine Budget Document, 1994-95.
31Maine’s population in 1990 was 1.228 million.
32The Department of Human Services was the relevant agency prior to the creation of OSA. In July
1990, OSA was created as a branch of the State’s Executive Department. After July 1, 1996, OSA was
transferred to the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services (see:
http://www.state.me.us/sos/cec/rcn/apa/depts.htm.) OSA is responsible for allocating state and federal
funds for substance abuse, and for contracting with the agencies receiving these funds.
33We ignore the agencies that exclusively provide treatment under the Driver Education and Evaluation
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variable Aij is equal to one if patient i is treated at that agency (j = 1; :::15).
Substance abuse patients di¤er with respect to diagnosis and treatment modality. Our
observation unit is a treatment episode, de…ned by an admission into treatment.34 We focus
on outpatients whose primary diagnosis is alcohol abuse,35 and further restrict the sample to
admissions in the four year period beginning October 1991. We also exclude repeat episodes,
focusing on …rst time clients.
The resulting sample consists of 7601 treatment episodes. Of these, 3402 patients com-
pleted treatment, 4040 left treatment prematurely for one reason or another, and 159 were
still in treatment at the end of the sample. To include the on-going patients in our econo-
metric model, we modify the likelihood function in (4) to:
fff(ti;¹i; ¾;¢hi)[1¡G(ti;¸i(¢))]gci £ fg(t;¸i(¢))[1¡ F (ti;¹i; ¾;¢hi]g1¡ci
£­i0(qi0jhi0)£ ¹­i(¹qijqi0; ¹hi; hi0)cigdi £ f[1¡G(ti;¸i(¢))][1¡ F (ti;¹i; ¾;¢hi]g1¡di(23)
where di = 1 if the patient has been discharged from treatment, and di = 0 if the patient is
still in treatment by the end of the sample. Notice that a patient who completes treatment
(ci = 1) or leaves treatment prematurely (ci = 0) is automatically discharged (di = 1): Table
Program (DEEP). While these agencies treat large numbers of patients, they are intrinsically di¤erent from
regular outpatient treatment. For example, DEEP patients need to complete a certain number of sessions
to recover their licenses. This would entail a very di¤erent model than the one we describe in Section 2.
34We have also de…ned as a unique episode all outpatient episodes pertaining to the same patient that
were concurrent in time or less than one month apart. In any of those cases we added the units of treatment
received under each episode and used as admission information the admission information of the …rst episode
and as discharge information the discharge information of the last episode. In most cases the di¤erent episodes
belonged to the same agency but in those cases where the agencies were di¤erent we attributed the merged
episode to the agency where the patient stayed longer.
35Outpatient treatment is essentially therapy. From the MATS data we distinguish individual, group, and
family therapy as separate modalities. While the MATS data also distinguishes “intensive outpatient” and
“adolescent outpatient” as distinct modalities, we include these in the category of individual therapy.
The MATS forms distinguish the treatment of primary clients from the treatment of codependents. A
codependent is someone who receives treatment to better deal with someone else’s substance abuse problem.
We restrict attention to primary alcohol abusers receiving outpatient treatment. A primary patient is
someone receiving treatment for their own substance abuse problem.
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Average Min Max Std
506.7 101 1388 422.8
Table 2: Statistics on number of patients per agency
Frequency of use at: completion
abstinent < once daily ¸ once daily
abstinent (obs=1967) 0.990 0.010 0.000
admission < once daily (obs=1277) 0.856 0.144 0.000
¸ once daily (obs=158) 0.968 0.006 0.025
Table 3: Sample transition matrix for completors
1 presents some statistics on number of episodes handled by the …fteen di¤erent treatment
agencies.
Three outcome variables are constructed from the MATS data. First, the discharge form
distinguishes patients who completed treatment from patients who left treatment for other
reasons.36 From this, we de…ne a dummy variable (ci) that is equal to one if the patient
completes treatment. Second, from the dates of admission and discharge we construct each
patient’s time in treatment (ti). Third, the MATS forms report the frequency of alcohol use
at both the time of admission and discharge. We de…ne two categorical variables (qi0; qi) to
measure frequency of use at admission and completion respectively. These variables equal
zero if the patient has been abstinent for at least one month, one if he currently uses alcohol
less than once a day, and two if his frequency of use is even greater. The sample transition
matrix for frequency of alcohol use is presented in Table 3.
Table 4 presents some summary data on completion of treatment, time in treatment, and
frequency of use at both admission and discharge, in the aggregate population and for the
36Other reasons for leaving treatment are: 1) client leaves treatment without explanation or refuses treat-
ment; 2) client cannot come to treatment either because of imprisonment or death; 3) and lastly the client
is discharged from treatment due to non-compliance with rules and regulations.
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Population Agency
obs=7601 mean s.d. mean min max s.d.
Status at
discharge
% completion (c = 1)
% premature exit (c = 0)
% did not …nish
44:8
53:2
2:1
49:7
49:9
14:3
44:0
52:3
3:7
31:7
22:7
0:5
59:4
65:6
18:0
9:5
12:2
4:9
Time
in
treatment
all
c = 1
c = 0
14:7
19:0
11:1
16:9
18:2
14:7
15:7
20:7
12:3
11:7
13:3
8:2
23:1
38:0
20:7
3:5
6:7
3:2
Frequency
of use at
completion
c = 1 abstinent
< once daily
¸ once daily
93:9
6:0
0:1
24:0
23:8
3:4
94:8
5:1
0:1
84:1
0:8
0:0
99:2
15:9
1:0
4:4
4:4
0:3
Frequency
of use at
admission
all
c = 1
c = 0
abstinent
< once daily
¸ once daily
abstinent
< once daily
¸ once daily
abstinent
< once daily
¸ once daily
50:2
39:1
10:7
57:8
37:5
4:6
43:9
40:4
15:7
50:0
48:8
30:9
49:4
48:4
21:1
49:6
49:1
36:4
48:3
40:0
11:7
55:8
38:8
5:3
42:1
41:4
16:4
34:7
25:5
6:2
38:2
25:5
1:8
25:0
21:1
10:3
67:8
56:3
20:8
70:7
56:6
11:3
65:8
58:6
23:3
10:7
8:9
4:8
9:6
8:8
3:2
11:9
10:6
4:3
Units of
treatment
all
c = 1
c = 0
8:6
11:0
6:6
10:4
11:4
9:0
9:5
12:5
7:6
6:2
8:4
4:8
14:9
22:7
11:7
2:5
4:3
2:1
Table 4: Dependent variables statistics
…fteen agencies. 44.8% of the patients completed treatment successfully (c = 1), and 53.2%
left treatment prematurely while only 2.1% of the patients are still in treatment by the end of
the sample period. However, the patient populations at di¤erent agencies had very di¤erent
average experiences. At the worst agency 31.7% of patients completed treatment, while at
best 59.4% completed treatment. The average agency had 44% completion rate, and the
standard deviation across agencies was 9.5%.
Similar agency heterogeneity is apparent for the average time patients spent in treatment
and for the probability that a patient is abstinent at the time of discharge. The average
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patient in the sample spent just under 15 weeks in treatment, but this average experience
could vary between just under 12 weeks and just over 23 weeks depending on the agency.
93.9% of patients completing treatment were abstinent at the time of discharge but this
success indicator could be as low as 84.1% or as high as 99.2% depending on the agency.
Our econometric methodology is intended to exploit this heterogeneity in outcomes across
agencies.
It is striking that a high percentage of patients enter treatment reporting that they have
been abstinent over the past month. While a signi…cant number of the patients come directly
out of the penal system (plausibly explaining their abstinence), it is certainly conceivable
that some patients may be misrepresenting their alcohol consumption prior to admission.
For such “measurement error” not to undermine interpretations of empirical results, we
must assume the underreporting does not vary across clinics conditional on observed patient
characteristics X.37
The bar chart in Figure 3 shows attrition for the entire sample population. These are
the number of patients in each week of treatment that left prematurely. Clearly, there is
an extraordinarily high attrition rate in the …rst week. After that, the empirical hazard is
approximately constant. To better account for this pattern we modify our attrition model
to allow for a higher probability of dropping out in the …rst week:
ln¸i1 = [°0Xi + °1Ai + °2µi + °3]°5 + °4 (24)
The extra coe¢cients °4 and °5 allow the hazard rate to jump discretely after the …rst week.
Other aspects of our model are the same as described earlier.
37In other words, the underreporting of frequency of use at admission can vary across clinics, but this
either be constant across clinics or be captured by the observables X. Frequency of use at admission is
recorded on the admission form, and in the later part of the sample again on the discharge form. We use the
former. By an oversight the latter was not extracted from MATS, which prevents us from checking reliability.
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Figure 3: Sample attrition
MATS also reports a number of patient characteristics that we include in Xi. Table 5
exhibits summary statistics of these characteristics. 40.2% of patients are male, although
some agencies have predominantly male populations and others the opposite. The average
patient is thirty-something with a monthly household income of about $87138 a month.
Average age is similar across the di¤erent agency populations, but there are clear di¤erences
in the average incomes.
We also include the source of payment for treatment as a patient characteristic. This
could be important for several reasons. The fact that treatment is paid out of pocket,
for example, could in‡uence a patient’s decision to exit treatment prematurely. Source of
payment also impacts reimbursement amounts for agencies, and thus could in‡uence an
agency’s determination of the completion time and/or the intensity of treatment. 35.1 % of
patients in the sample pay for treatment out of pocket, 17.0% have private insurance, and
another 23.9% are covered by Medicaid or Medicare. Treatment costs for 18.9% of patients in
the sample nominally are covered by public funds allocated to the agency by OSA. Treatment
costs for the small remainder of patients are paid by various other forms of public assistance
and insurance. There is signi…cant heterogeneity of revenue sources across agencies. It is
38This is the average monthly income when income is known and stated by the patient and is not bigger
than $9999.
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also noteworthy that the majority of patients are involved with the legal system in some
way. 21.3% are on parole or probation, and 28.5% are in treatment in connection with
drunk-driving violations.
The last set of patient characteristics are variables relating more directly to a patient’s
health status at admission. First, we construct dummy variables from the clinician’s assess-
ment of the severity of the patient’s condition, indicating whether the patient is a “casual,”
“life-style involved,” “life-style dependent,” or “dysfunctional” user, or if the patient’s sever-
ity is “undetermined.” Second, we construct dummy variables indicating whether in the past
month the patient’s drinking caused problems on the job or at school “not at all,” “infre-
quently,” “occasionally,” or “frequently.” Third, we construct a dummy variable indicating
whether the patient has a concurrent psychiatric condition. All of these dummy variables
are included in our list of patient characteristics (X). The interpretation here is that these
variables are direct predictors of unobserved health status hi0. In particular, if our observed
severity variable was continuous rather than reported in a coarse ordering, we might expect
it to perfectly measure hi0 (or perhaps a linear combination of severity, problems on the jobs
and psychiatric condition might perfectly measure hi0). We also allow the more exogenous
characteristics, i.e. the socioeconomic characteristics, to enter hi0 to the extent that the
discretized variables do not perfectly measure unobserved health. This is important to re-
member in interpreting the coe¢cients on the socioeconomic characteristics - the coe¢cient
on income, for example, measures the impact of income conditional on our observed severity
measure.
We obtain unit cost data from a separate data set on each agency’s contracts with OSA.
Each agency’s annual contract states budgeted total cost and budgeted units of treatment
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obs=7601 Population Agency
Mean Std. Mean Min Max Std
Male 40.2 49.0 35.6 1.6 91.1 28.8
Age 33.1 10.8 33.1 30.3 36.2 1.5
Married 23.6 42.4 24.0 14.8 28.3 3.9
Income (·$9999) 870.9 885.1 906.8 631.4 1172.3 170.7
Unemployed 32.2 46.7 30.3 17.4 40.4 7.2
Payer OSA 18.9 39.2 17.4 0.8 54.3 15.7
self 35.1 47.7 34.5 8.6 61.2 15.3
private ins. 17.0 37.6 16.4 4.7 25.0 6.3
medicaid/care 23.9 42.6 24.5 15.6 39.5 6.1
other 5.1 21.9 7.2 1.7 18.8 4.5
Legal Inv. none 41.3 49.2 42.6 18.2 75.3 13.9
prob./parole 21.3 40.9 21.8 9.0 45.1 10.6
drunk driving 28.5 45.1 26.4 1.0 49.2 12.6
other 8.9 28.5 9.2 3.8 16.1 3.4
Adm. date days 11923 394 11955 11620 12193 152
Quarter I 20.2 40.2 20.4 10.9 30.7 5.4
II 25.4 43.5 25.8 20.3 31.0 3.0
III 27.6 44.7 27.1 17.8 32.8 4.2
IV 26.7 44.3 26.8 20.5 36.7 3.6
Severity casual/exp. 23.4 42.3 23.8 13.2 44.5 10.0
involved 17.3 37.8 16.6 4.5 25.8 5.7
dependent 40.5 49.5 42.2 29.5 63.4 7.6
dysfunctional 18.4 38.8 16.8 0.0 43.3 12.3
undetermined 0.4 6.4 0.5 0.0 2.1 0.7
Job problems none 88.5 31.9 86.0 60.4 95.8 96.1
infrequent 6.3 24.3 7.3 1.0 14.9 4.3
occasional 2.7 16.3 3.9 1.2 13.9 3.5
frequent 2.4 15.4 2.8 0.6 10.9 2.6
Pyschiatric problems 11.7 32.1 14.4 5.8 41.1 10.0
Table 5: Patient characteristics
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for each treatment modality (e.g. group treatment is typically much less expensive than
individual treatment). This gives us unit costs for individual, group and family therapy
for each agency. We use relative unit costs to weight units of group and family therapy
appropriately and construct the variable “total adjusted units of treatment” for each patient.
This serves as the dependent variable in the units of treatment equation.39
Total costs for the policy simulations in subsection 4.3 are then constructed bymultiplying
predicted “adjusted units of treatment” by the unit cost of individual therapy. In these
simulations we hypothesize that all patients were treated in 1993. 1993 unit costs for each
agency were calculated by de‡ating the nominal unit cost of individual therapy by a 1992
county hospital wage index.40
4 Estimation results
4.1 Population and treatment e¤ects
We focus primarily on our estimates of the treatment e¤ects in the di¤erent agencies. These
measure how the production of health varies between agencies after controlling for both
observed and unobserved characteristics of agency populations. Our estimated coe¢cients
on the X’s are discussed in the appendix.
Table 6 presents estimated coe¢cients and standard errors for the various population and
39The calculated weights for group treatment were based on 1990-91 contract data, and for family treatment
1990-94 contract data. It was necessary to “clean” the data with various approximations to deal with the
problems of missing observations, breaks in the series, and other problems.
40The cost de‡ator is actually a patient-weighted average hospital wage index that accounts appropriately
for multicounty operations of some agencies. We lacked hospital wages for Sagadahoc county, and estimated
the de‡ator for this county by the population-weighted de‡ator of the four neighboring counties.
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treatment e¤ects.41 ;42 As discussed earlier, the coe¢cients in the h0 equation are “population
e¤ects,” measuring how patient populations of the agencies di¤er on average in their unob-
served characteristics. The coe¢cients reported for ¹, ¹h, and ¸ are the “treatment e¤ects,”
e.g. for the drift equation, we report ±1 rather than the total agency e¤ect (±1 + ±2®1). The
reported estimates are expressed as deviations from the population weighted mean, enabling
a clear interpretation of statistically signi…cant coe¢cients. For example, the fact that the
treatment e¤ect in the drift equation of Agency 1 is positive and signi…cant indicates that a
patient who remains in treatment at Agency 1 achieves a given completion threshold quicker
than at a randomly assigned agency with the probability of assignment to an agency equal
to the agency’s population share.
First, the signi…cance of nine of the …fteen population e¤ects in the …rst column suggests
that these agencies do di¤er in the unobserved characteristics of their populations. As
noted above, this suggests agency assignment is not “exogenous” and, given the fact that
most patients attend the nearest clinic, calls into question any potential instruments for
agency assignment. There are also very signi…cant di¤erences in treatment e¤ects across the
agencies. Eight of the drift e¤ects, twelve of the completion threshold e¤ects, ten of the
dropout probability e¤ects, and eleven of the unit equation e¤ects are signi…cantly di¤erent
from zero. Di¤erences in the di¤erent dimensions of the treatment process across agencies
do not appear to be independent. The correlations between the population e¤ect for h0
and the treatment e¤ects for ¹, h, and ¸ across the …fteen agencies are reported in Table 7.
Agencies whose patient populations are unobservably healthier at admission do not tend to
41This table arbitrarily orders agencies. The arbitrary numbering of agencies is necessary to preserve
the con…dentiality of individual agency information. Hereafter, we identify the individual agencies by this
ranking.
42Our additive normalization is that the average population e¤ect in the hi0 equation is zero (i.e. the
j-dimensional row vector ®1 satis…es
P
i ®1Ai = 0):
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h0 (®1) ¹ (±1) h (¯1) ¸ (°1) ln(u)
average agency
0
(0)
¡0:0288
(0:0302)
6:0802
(0:1671)
¡3:9834
(0:1881)
1:6790
(0:1087)
agency 1
¡0:3891
(0:1470)
0:0554
(0:0206)
0:2005
(0:2522)
¡0:6041
(0:1553)
0:2425
(0:0513)
agency 2
0:0035
(0:2093)
0:0511
(0:0169)
2:1703
(0:2040)
¡0:6601
(0:2427)
0:6534
(0:1106)
agency 3
0:9086
(0:1448)
0:0605
(0:0235)
2:1741
(0:3285)
0:5162
(0:1781)
¡0:2726
(0:0659)
agency 4
¡0:5437
(0:1894)
0:0229
(0:0329)
¡0:7319
(0:2176)
¡0:4144
(0:2163)
0:3000
(0:0901)
agency 5
¡0:2357
(0:2033)
¡0:0668
(0:0251)
¡1:4199
(0:2087)
¡1:1751
(0:2653)
0:3453
(0:1011)
agency 6
0:2616
(0:1100)
¡0:0036
(0:0106)
¡0:5903
(0:2234)
0:2048
(0:1108)
¡0:1731
(0:0403)
agency 7
¡0:1775
(0:0582)
0:0037
(0:0089)
¡0:2458
(0:0673)
0:3409
(0:0738)
¡0:2246
(0:0331)
agency 8
¡0:0643
(0:0937)
¡0:0050
(0:0086)
0:0341
(0:1973)
0:0194
(0:0991)
0:0665
(0:0339)
agency 9
¡0:8579
(0:1908)
¡0:0092
(0:0313)
¡1:3950
(0:2381)
¡0:5406
(0:2463)
¡0:0498
(0:1055)
agency 10
¡0:8879
(0:1693)
¡0:0231
(0:0280)
¡1:6201
(0:2943)
¡0:8309
(0:2121)
0:2514
(0:0807)
agency 11
0:8383
(0:2207)
¡0:0109
(0:0273)
1:4175
(0:2915)
0:4601
(0:2429)
¡0:0565
(0:0993)
agency 12
¡0:2578
(0:1718)
¡0:0294
(0:0159)
¡1:3045
(0:3076)
¡0:0638
(0:1947)
¡0:0093
(0:0777)
agency 13
¡0:2549
(0:1674)
¡0:0331
(0:0138)
0:6574
(0:2931)
¡0:1275
(0:1674)
0:2742
(0:0694)
agency 14
¡0:3125
(0:2180)
¡0:0446
(0:0188)
¡0:3767
(0:3581)
¡0:1406
(0:2017)
0:2189
(0:0798)
agency 15
0:9714
(0:1705)
¡0:0525
(0:0238)
1:3101
(0:3278)
0:2324
(0:2228)
0:0693
(0:0895)
Table 6: Estimated population (h0) and treatment e¤ects (in equations for ¹, h, ¸) expressed
as deviations from the average agency
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h0 ¹ h ¸ ln(u)
h0 1
0:088
(0:318)
0:757¤
(0:059)
0:709¤
(0:086)
¡0:383¤
(0:1328)
¹ 1
0:476
(0:249)
0:135
(0:281)
¡0:030
(0:172)
h 1
0:498¤
(0:103)
0:017
(0:132)
¸ 1
¡0:746¤
(0:079)
ln(u) 1
Table 7: Correlation between agency population h0 and treatment e¤ects (¹, h, ¸)
have higher or lower drifts, but do tend to have more demanding completion standards and
more trouble keeping their patients until treatment is complete.
Di¤erences in the population and treatment e¤ects can be summarized by comparing the
pro…le of average patients. Table 8 presents the averages of the initial health, the drift
of the treatment process, the completion threshold, and the attrition hazard for various
patient populations.43 The requisite health improvement for completion of treatment of the
average patient in the whole sample is ¢h = h ¡ h0 = 5:3318: With a drift of ¹ = 0:1722,
this patient would take almost 31 weeks to complete treatment if there was no attrition.
However, the patient has a 12:7 percent probability of leaving treatment in the …rst week,
and a 3:7 percent probability of premature exit each week thereafter. Thus, the probability
that this patient completes treatment eventually is around 61 percent and the expected
43The estimated variance of the Wiener process is ¾^2 = 0:5065: The last column of Table 8 reports the
average of the time-independent dropout hazard, i.e.:
¸i(t) = exp(°0Xi + (°1 + °2®1)Ai + °2"i)
The actual time-dependent dropout hazard requires multiplying the reported estimate by eb°3t and making
the appropriate adjustment for the …rst period hazard. However the estimated b°3 is close to zero, so the
reported estimate is very close to the actual hazard after date 1. The date 1 hazard is higher as discussed
earlier.
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time to completion conditional on not dropping out is 12:2 weeks.44 The big di¤erence in
expected times to completion shows the importance of controlling for the selection problem
in the data. In contrast, the health improvement at completion for the average patient
assigned to Agency 1 is ¢h = 6:2673. With a more e¤ective treatment regime indicated by
¹ = 0:2283, this patient would complete treatment in 27:5 weeks if there was no attrition.
The probability of completing treatment eventually is of 62 percent, and the expected time
to completion conditional on not dropping out is 14:27 weeks. Finally, Table 9 compares
how the average patient in the whole sample fares at each of the agencies. In contrast
to Table 8 these di¤erences are due just to treatment e¤ects. The average patient in the
population completes treatment at Agency 1 after a health improvement of ¢h = 5:5,
expects to complete treatment after 24 weeks, and has a 73:3 percent probability of successful
completion. Thus, it appears from these calculations that Agency 1 has a more e¤ective
treatment program than the average agency.
All other estimated coe¢cients are presented and discussed in the Appendix.
4.2 Goodness of …t
How well does the estimated model …t the data? Figures 4 and 5 compare the estimated val-
ues and the actual data for time in treatment for di¤erent completion status. The predicted
drop-out hazards tracks the data very closely. The model fares a bit worse at predicting the
timing of the completion of treatment. The estimated model noticeably underpredicts fre-
44The probability of completion (conditional on not dropping out) is computed averaging the following
probability across patients:
300X
t=1
³
f(t; b¹i; b¾i;d¢hi)[1¡G(t; b¸i(¢))]´ :
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h0 ¹ h ¸ e
¡°3t
sample 0:6175 0:1722 5:9493 0:0368
Agency 1 ¡0:0318 0:2283 6:2355 0:0318
Agency 2 ¡0:8051 0:1279 6:8785 0:0281
Agency 3 1:7953 0:2027 7:6499 0:0286
Agency 4 ¡0:1404 0:1821 5:4164 0:0457
Agency 5 ¡0:3045 0:1366 4:4338 0:0091
Agency 6 0:8029 0:1876 4:9980 0:0328
Agency 7 0:6235 0:1922 6:0712 0:0583
Agency 8 0:3661 0:1669 5:8530 0:0409
Agency 9 ¡0:4575 0:1750 5:0079 0:0531
Agency 10 0:0208 0:1260 5:6259 0:0425
Agency 11 1:9920 0:1801 7:0329 0:0185
Agency 12 0:3885 0:1544 4:7925 0:0420
Agency 13 0:5707 0:1131 7:0552 0:0402
Agency 14 0:1452 0:1380 5:7866 0:0444
Agency 15 1:6040 0:1126 6:2267 0:0146
Table 8: Estimated treatment process for average patients
h0 ¹ h ¸e
¡°3t
Agency 1 0:6175 0:2275 6:1498 0:0201
Agency 2 0:6175 0:2233 8:1196 0:0190
Agency 3 0:6175 0:2327 8:1234 0:0616
Agency 4 0:6175 0:1951 5:2174 0:0243
Agency 5 0:6175 0:1054 4:5294 0:0114
Agency 6 0:6175 0:1685 5:3591 0:0451
Agency 7 0:6175 0:1758 5:7036 0:0517
Agency 8 0:6175 0:1672 5:9835 0:0375
Agency 9 0:6175 0:1630 4:5543 0:0214
Agency 10 0:6175 0:1491 4:3292 0:0160
Agency 11 0:6175 0:1613 7:3669 0:0583
Agency 12 0:6175 0:1428 4:6448 0:0345
Agency 13 0:6175 0:1391 6:6068 0:0324
Agency 14 0:6175 0:1276 5:5726 0:0320
Agency 15 0:6175 0:1196 7:2594 0:0464
Table 9: Estimated average treatment process for the whole sample when treated at di¤erent
clinics
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Figure 4: Probability of droping out in date t
quency of completions in weeks 12-15, and slightly overpredicts completions in weeks 21-27.
Still, the …ts seem reasonable given the parsimony of our model of the treatment process.
We have also estimated the frequency of use of all patients conditional on the probability
of completion. A comparison of Tables 3 and 10 shows that the model predicts quite well the
frequency of use at completion of patients who are light alcohol users at admission, while it
underpredicts the probability of abstinence at completion of heavier drinkers at admission.
4.3 Productivity comparisons
We next compare the productivities of these …fteen treatment agencies. Our estimated model
enables us to compute the hypothetical aggregate health improvement and total costs for any
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Figure 5: Probability of Completing in date t
population of patients assigned to any treatment program. We consider sixteen possible
patient populations – the sample populations of each of the …fteen treatment agencies as
well as the entire sample population, and can match these sixteen patient populations to the
…fteen agencies in all possible ways. To better visualize these conceptual experiments consider
the problem of comparing the productivity of two di¤erent teachers in a school. A simple
and natural experiment for comparing teaching productivities would be to switch teachers,
Frequency of use at: Expected frequency of use at completion
abstinent < once daily ¸ once daily Total
abstinent 0:9864 0:0135 0:00015 1:0
admission < once daily 0:9236 0:0742 0:00223 1:0
¸ once daily 0:7564 0:2252 0:01844 1:0
Table 10: Average estimated frequency of use across all patients conditional on the proba-
bility of completion
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keeping classes …xed, and measure the performance of each class under each teacher. This
type of comparison implicitly controls for di¤erent characteristics of the two classes. Our
simulations emulate similar controlled experiments in a health services treatment setting.
Productivity is a standard measure of economic e¢ciency. In manufacturing industries,
productivity is measured simply by dividing aggregate output by aggregate cost. In a health
services setting, however, the measurement of productivity is complicated by the fact that it
is not clear how to most appropriately measure output. The most obvious output measure
in our setting is health improvement, i.e. the change in the latent variable representing
the health of the patient. Thus, output is ¢hi = hi ¡ h0i for a patient who completes
treatment (since by de…nition, patients who have completed treatment have achieved level
hi). For patients who drop out prematurely, output is hti ¡ h0i, where t is the time of
dropout. Aggregate output is measured by summing expected health improvement over the
patient population being considered. Aggregate cost is measured by multiplying an agency’s
estimated total units of treatment by its unit cost of treatment. These measures enable our
productivity calculations.45
More precisely, consider the expected total increase in latent health that would result
if agency k were to treat population j. The fact that we have separated population and
treatment e¤ects is critical for this procedure. When agency k treats population j, we use
the treatment e¤ects of agency k, but the population e¤ects of population j. In other words,
the fact that population j is relatively hard or easy to treat goes with that population when
we move the population to di¤erent agencies. The fact that agency k is more or less e¤ective
45The Appendix considers aggregate abstinence as an alternative output measure. In the the next section,
we consider some conceptual problems with using these productivity estimates to measure economic e¢ciency,
and adopt a less restrictive approach.
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(±1), or has di¤erent completion thresholds (¯1), etc. stays with the agency as we assign to it
di¤erent patient populations. In some cases, we compare our results and policy predictions
to simulations in which we naively assume that all the patient populations are unobservably
identical, i.e. where there are no population e¤ects.
Given our estimated parameters (bhi0; b¹ik; bhik; b¸ik; ¾^; i = 1; :::N); the total expected in-
crease in health of population j at agency k is given by the following formula:
NX
i=1
AijE"i[(
bhik ¡ bhi0) 1X
t=1
f(t; b¹ik; b¾; bhik ¡ bhi0)³1¡G(t; b¸ik)´ dt+
1X
t=1
0BB@b¹ikt¡ 2(bhik ¡ bhi0) exp
Ã
2b¹ik(bhik ¡ bhi0)b¾2
! ©µ¡(bhik¡bhi0)¡b¹iktb¾pt ¶
1¡ F (t; b¹i; b¾; bhik ¡ bhi0)
1CCA
£g(t; b¸ik)(1¡ F (t; b¹i; b¾; bhik ¡ bhi0)dt] (25)
The …rst line of the expression gives the expected health improvement conditional on comple-
tion multiplied by the probability of completion. The next two lines give the expected health
improvement conditional on premature exit at each date t, multiplied by the probability of
exit at that date, and summed over all possible exit dates.46 To actually compute (25), we
simulate the expectation over the distribution of the unobserved characteristics "i.47
We divide this measure of aggregate output by aggregate cost to calculate productivity.
Aggregate cost is measured by multiplying the predicted treatment units for patient i in
agency k; from equation (22), by the unit cost of agency k. As explained earlier, we translate
all units of treatment into equivalent units of individual therapy, and use the unit cost of
46The formula for expected health improvement conditional on not having completed at date t can be
found in Lancaster (1990, pp. 119-121).
47The simulation truncates the in…nite sum of completion dates at T = 300. As the probability of a patient
staying more than even 200 weeks is extremely small, there is no apparent di¤erences between truncating
the sum at 200 or 300.
38
individual therapy for …scal year 1993. In doing so, we are implicitly assuming that unit
costs are exogenously …xed and do not vary with the patient population. The reason for
choosing …scal year 1993 for these productivity comparisons is that all agencies had programs
running in that year and therefore we have comparable cost information.
The estimated productivities for agencies treating their own patient population and the
entire sample population are presented in Table 11. There are three columns in the table.48 ;49
The …rst reports the productivities of each agency when treating its own population. These
productivities do not control for di¤erences in either observed or unobserved patient char-
acteristics across agencies. The second column simulates productivities for each agency
treating the entire sample population under the naive assumption that there are no popu-
lation e¤ects, i.e. that the estimated agency …xed e¤ects in the drift, threshold, dropout,
and units equations are entirely treatment e¤ects. This comparison controls for observable
patient characteristics (because all agencies are treating the same population) but makes no
attempt to control for population di¤erences in the unobservable characteristic. The last
column reports simulated productivities of the entire population that account appropriately
for the estimated population e¤ects. This last simulation accounts for both observable and
unobservable di¤erences across patient populations.
48In making these calculation we assume that all patients enter treatment beginning in January 1993. We
adjust the time dependent variables in our estimated treatment model accordingly, and use unit cost data
for this year. The numbers presented in Tables 11, 17, and 18 (see appendix) have been multiplied by 1000.
49As the estimated productivities are highly non-linear functions of the parameters, we compute their
standard errors by bootstrapping the data and estimation. Since actual estimation is very time consuming
(1 to 2 weeks of CPU time), we follow Andrews(1999) suggestion and use a K-step bootstrap. Using the
actual estimates as starting parameters, we take K Gauss-Newton steps with the resampled data. While
Andrews suggests that K = 10 or 20 works reasonably in many cases, we use K = 100, which still leads to
a signi…cant time savings.
The same bootstrapping methodology is used in our technology transfer experiment below. This is
necessary because we employ separate estimation procedures for the basic model and one for the units
equation. The bootstrap simulations provide con…dence intervals that account for the correlations between
the estimated parameters in the two sets of equations.
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Table 11 reveals signi…cant di¤erences of the productivities of the agencies. Agency pro-
ductivities are as high as 12.87 and as low as 5.62, a di¤erence of two to three times the
“health” per dollar spent. There are also notable di¤erences in the ranking of agencies across
the columns. Ignoring both observable and unobservable di¤erences in the agency popula-
tions leads to the conclusion that Agency 1 is the top performer and Agency 13 the worst. In
contrast, recognizing and controlling only for observable population di¤erences shows that
Agency 2 is the best performer and Agency 15 the worst, while controlling for all di¤erences
in population, Agency 2 remains the best and Agency 10 is the worst.
The di¤erence between the estimated productivites in …rst and second columns of Table
11 can be interpreted as capturing the e¤ect of controlling for the observable characteristics.
Analogously, the di¤erence between the second and third columns captures the e¤ect of
controlling for unobservable characteristics. The variance of the …rst e¤ect (the di¤erence
between columns 1 and 2) across agencies is 1.52 while the variance of the second e¤ect (the
di¤erence between columns 2 and 3) is 2.00. This suggests that controlling for di¤erences in
unobserved characteristics across agencies is as much, if not more, important than controlling
for observed characteristics.
4.4 E¢ciency frontiers
While productivities often are convenient and intuitive measures of economic e¢ciency, pro-
ductivity comparisons can tell a misleading story in a health services setting. While man-
ufacturing industries do not produce outputs without inputs, it is not necessarily true that
patients would not recover without health treatment. Unfortunately, our data set does not
contain any observations on patients not entering treatment, which prevents us from directly
40
Own population
Entire population
NOT accounting for pop. e¤.
Entire population
accounting for pop. e¤.
Agency product. ranking product. ranking product. ranking
1
12:87
(0:895)
1
12:88
(0:940)
2
10:96
(0:842)
2
2
12:08
(1:480)
2
15:50
(1:477)
1
14:95
(1:347)
1
3
8:38
(0:591)
11
8:11
(0:620)
13
9:33
(0:902)
4
4
9:45
(1:517)
6
10:48
(1:359)
3
8:36
(1:045)
7
5
10:94
(1:450)
3
10:01
(1:619)
4
8:45
(1:219)
6
6
9:10
(0:654)
8
8:37
(0:702)
11
8:71
(0:894)
5
7
9:34
(0:587)
7
8:86
(0:645)
7
8:09
(0:542)
9
8
7:90
(0:528)
12
8:04
(0:553)
14
7:55
(0:542)
12
9
8:83
(1:144)
10
8:97
(1:109)
6
6:27
(0:846)
14
10
7:12
(0:733)
13
8:55
(0:719)
10
5:67
(0:750)
15
11
10:30
(1:245)
4
8:74
(1:216)
8
10:17
(1:560)
3
12
9:96
(0:937)
5
9:58
(0:930)
5
8:17
(0:938)
8
13
5:62
(0:814)
15
7:26
(0:758)
12
6:61
(0:685)
13
14
8:87
(1:228)
9
8:70
(1:208)
9
7:59
(1:048)
11
15
6:69
(0:782)
14
6:31
(0:803)
15
7:87
(1:319)
10
Table 11: Agency rankings according to estimated productivities in terms of health
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addressing this issue.50
Using the productivity measures as comparative e¢ciency indicators implicitly assumes
that patients would not change health status if they were not to receive treatment. Figure
6, which graphs total costs vs. total health improvement, illustrates the problem. Given
a particular patient population, we can plot di¤erent agencies on this graph according to
their total costs of treating this population and the total health improvement achieved.
Productivities equal the slope of the line between each agency point and the origin. Thus in
Figure 6 Agency A has the highest productivity and Agency C the lowest. Suppose, however,
that instead of getting 0 health improvement with no treatment, untreated patients were to
achieve a total health improvement of 10. In this case, the “true” productivity of treatment
would equal the slope of the line connecting each agency point to the point 10 on the vertical
axis, and the ranking of productivities would be exactly reversed.
Another possible problem with a productivity measure based on the ratio of total output
per total cost is the possibility of diminishing or increasing returns to treatment at the level
of the individual patient. Suppose some agencies tend to give each patient more intense
treatment than other agencies (e.g. more units of treatment per week), one might expect to
…nd diminishing returns, i.e. patients marginal health improvement from an extra dollar of
treatment declines as the intensity of treatment increases. As can be easily observed from
the example in …gure 6, the productivity measures are simply the magnitude of the slopes
of straight lines joining each point A, B, and C with the origin, and, therefore, in the case
where the true production function is concave we may wrongly conclude that agency C is
performing badly when in fact agency C is on the production frontier.51
50See the Appendix for some observations in reference to the received substance abuse treatment literature.
51Note that our model implicitly does not allow increasing or decreasing returns to the amount of time a
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Figure 6: An example of health improvement versus total costs
There are several possible avenues of attack on these problems. One possibility is to use
our structural model to “scale up” or “scale down” production at the various agencies to
bring them to comparable points. For example, we could scale up production at Agency A
and scale down production at Agency C so that all three agencies produce the same level of
health. One could then compare costs to rank the di¤erent agencies. While this is possible
in our model, it is not clear on what margins to scale production. For example, for Agency
C we could either decrease its completion standards or decrease the amount of treatment it
is giving patients per week. Another issue is that in doing this, we would need to presume
that the other treatment e¤ects for the agency remain the same. It might be inappropriate,
for example, to assume that increasing the amount of treatment per week doesn’t a¤ect
patient spends in treatment or scale economies in the number of patients receiving treatment.
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dropout probabilities. A second solution would be to postulate social preferences over
health/cost space, e.g. draw indi¤erence curves in Figure 6 and rank agencies based on these
indi¤erence curves. However, we have no particular insight into how society values latent
health improvements.
We adopt what seems like a less presumptuous approach by limiting ourselves to conclu-
sions about the relative performance of agencies that have a dominance relationship. That
is, if a certain agency provides a given population with no more health improvement than
would another agency and yet has higher total costs, then we conclude that the …rst agency
is dominated and not performing e¢ciently. On the one hand, this relative performance
comparison makes no assumptions about either the e¤ects of no treatment, economies of
scale in treatment intensity, or societal preferences, other than that the same amount of
treatment for lower cost is better. On the other hand, this is admittedly a conservative
approach to comparing the performances of the treatment agencies, because it implicitly
only values cost reductions and not health improvements.
Figure 7 plots our …fteen agencies in health/cost space. These points examine the situ-
ation in which each agency treats the entire population, controlling appropriately for popu-
lation and treatment e¤ects. An agency is dominated in this experiment if there is another
agency to the northeast of it on the diagram. As can be seen, there are a number of dom-
inated agencies. For example, Agencies 9 and 10 provide less health than Agency 11, but
spend almost double the money on treatment; Agency 13 provides less health than Agency
4, but spends $500,000 more. The only agencies that are not dominated are Agencies 2, 4,
6, 11, and 12. One can visualize a downward sloping e¢ciency frontier on the diagram,
specifying for any given total cost the total health improvement that an e¢cient agency can
44
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Figure 7: Health improvement versus costs
produce. We can conclude that the dominated agencies are not on this frontier, i.e. would
not provide treatment to the entire population e¢ciently. While we cannot necessarily con-
clude that the undominated …rms are on the true frontier (i.e. the frontier may lie to the
northeast), we will loosely describe them as …rms on the e¢ciency frontier.
These e¢ciency …gures are just point estimates. Using our resampling bootstrap methods
(see footnote 46), we can statistically test whether …rms are ine¢cient. For a given number
of bootstrapped parameter vectors, we compute how many times a particular agency is
undominated, i.e. when the agency is on the e¢ciency frontier. The proportion of bootstrap
repetitions when this occurs serves as a p-value for the null hypotheses that a …rm is on the
frontier. For example, if an agency is on the frontier in only 3% of the bootstrap repetitions,
we reject the null hypothesis that the agency is e¢cient with 97% con…dence. We can reject
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that Agencies 8, 9, 10, and 13 are e¢cient with at least 95% con…dence. Agency 2 is the
only …rm that we can reject being dominated by another …rm.52
4.5 Transfering of best practices
The above analysis considers the health/cost trade-o¤ for the entire patient population. We
also examine these trade-o¤s for each particular agency’s patient populations by constructing
similar …gures. For each agency’s population we compare the estimated outcomes and costs
of treatment against the simulated outcomes and costs if the population were treated by
other agencies. In particular, we note whether there is another agency that can provide at
least the same amount of health as the originating agency, but at lower cost. If there are
multiple agencies that can provide more treatment at less cost, we choose the lowest cost
agency. The …nal goal of this exercise is to estimate a lower bound of how much money Maine
could save (without compromising health outcomes) by transferring the practice styles of the
more e¢cient agencies.
Table 12 reports estimated savings that could be achieved by “transferring best practices”
of more e¢cient agencies. We order the results by the total cost savings, i.e. transfers that
save the most money are listed …rst. The …rst transfer has Agency 10 transferring its practice
style to Agency 5, saving $46,000, more than 2% of the overall expenditures (at all …fteen
clinics). There are a total of ten cost-saving transfers - there is no potential cost savings
for Agencies 2, 4, 6, 11, and 12. The total cost saving due to the ten transfers is $163,000,
7.4% of the total budget for the …fteen agencies. Bootstrapped standard errors show that
52More details on these tests are in the Appendix in comparison to similar tests using abstinence as an
output measure.
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transferring practice styles between clinics can lead to signi…cant cost savings.53;54
The virtue of using our measure of latent health as an output measure is that it e¤ectively
combines information from multiple output measures. However, one can also use single, yet
more tangible, output measures. Table 1 in the introduction reproduces the analysis using
abstinence. Other output measures such as, for instance, completion of treatment could
be used as well. Comparing tables 1 and 12, the agencies that would most bene…t from
technology transfer are similar, but the agencies who transfer the practices are somewhat
di¤erent. As noted above, we favor the “latent health” results since they use information
from all the output measures in our dataset.
4.6 Explaining superior performance
In this section we present some evidence that supports the idea that the superior perfor-
mance of certain agencies is idiosyncratic, i.e. due to di¤erences in practice styles, and not
related to observable and exogenous agency characteristics. We concentrate on two agency
characteristics: size, and importance of group treatment vis-a-vis individual therapy. Size
is measured by the average annual budget for (individual, group and family) outpatient
treatment,55 and group units is the ratio between adjusted units of group treatment and
total units of treatment.56 We normalized size by dividing it by its standard deviation.
53Importantly, with our bootstrapped parameter vectors, we do not recompute the optimal transfers. As
such, some of these transfers can potentially cost money (for particular bootstrapped parameter vectors).
54Note that while the direct e¤ect of these transfers is to save money, there are also a potential side e¤ect
of improving health outcomes (since in some cases the new “owners” not only save money but produce more
health). For both outcome variables, health improvement (abstinence rates) goes up a total of about 1-2%
with the transfers.
55We ignore the budget for evaluation because we have excluded from our sample patients who only
received evaluation.
56We use the same approach as in Section 2.2. In order to obtain a total number of units we add family
and group units after we multiply them by their weights. Again their weights are given by their relative costs
in terms of “individual” treatment. Lastly evaluation units are assumed to be equivalent to “individual”
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Controlling for Unobservable Population E¤ects
Population of Treated by Cumulative Cumulative
Agency Agency $ Savings $ Savings % Savings
10 5 46131:43
46131:43
(14573:13)
0:0210
(0:0067)
13 4 30948:07
77079:50
(22078:73)
0:0351
(0:0100)
15 11 18765:26
95844:76
(24922:34)
0:0436
(0:0114)
7 11 17265:06
113109:82
(44368:38)
0:0515
(0:0202)
3 2 16893:51
130003:33
(52250:61)
0:0592
(0:0237)
14 11 9441:98
139445:31
(55455:86)
0:0635
(0:0252)
8 4 8958:95
148404:26
(72829:64)
0:0675
(0:0331)
9 5 8676:63
157080:89
(73558:75)
0:0715
(0:0335)
5 11 3253:42
160334:31
(74488:06)
0:0730
(0:0339)
1 2 2217:06
162551:37
(81150:72)
0:0740
(0:0369)
11 11 0
162551:37
(81150:72)
0:0740
(0:0369)
6 6 0
162551:37
(81150:72)
0:0740
(0:0369)
4 4 0
162551:37
(81150:72)
0:0740
(0:0369)
12 12 0
162551:37
(81150:72)
0:0740
(0:0369)
2 2 0
162551:37
(81150:72)
0:0740
(0:0369)
Table 12: Cost reducing technology transfers, controlling for population e¤ects in terms of
health
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agency category good medium poor
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
size 0:037 0:032 0:066 0:063 0:067 0:055
% group 1:136 0:555 1:663 1:261 1:291 1:261
Table 13: Mean and variances of agency characteristics by agency category
The correlation between these two agency characteristics is around 0:35. In order to show
approximately how these agency characteristics correlate with performance, we categorize
agencies into three groups according to their proximity to the e¢ciency frontier (see …g-
ure 7).57 Table 13 shows the mean and variance for the variables across the three agency
categories.58 These results suggest that superior performance is likely to re‡ect di¤erent
“practice styles.”
5 Conclusions
We have developed and applied a methodology for comparing the performance of providers of
alcohol abuse treatment in Maine. Our results should be interpreted tentatively for drawing
speci…c policy conclusions about alcohol abuse treatment in Maine. It is certainly possible
to analyze more data more extensively. Nevertheless, our analysis of the Maine data illus-
trates a sound methodology for relative performance evaluations that is potentially a useful
public policy tool. The methodology enables a separate identi…cation of agency “popula-
treatment units.
57Good performers include agencies f2; 4; 6; 11; 12g, bad performers include agencies f8; 9; 10; 13g and
medium performers include agencies f1; 3; 5; 7; 14; 15g.
58We made simple tests on the equality of means across agency categories. We were not able to reject that
the mean of “percentage group” of good performers is lower than the mean for medium and bad performers.
For the variable size we were never able to reject the null of common means across agency categories. All
tests were done assuming the variables were normally distributed. Finally we ran simple OLS regressions
with the classi…cation into the three groups as the dependent variable and size and percentage group as
explanatory variables. Conditioning on percentage group made the size coe¢cient positive although small
and not statistically di¤erent from zero. The group coe¢cient was negative but not statistically signi…cantly
di¤erent from zero.
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tion e¤ects” and “treatment e¤ects” which enables us to compare how di¤erent agencies
would perform treating the same populations. We conclude that di¤erent agencies have
signi…cantly di¤erent treatment e¤ects, governing the e¤ectiveness of treatment, standards
of completion of treatment, and the ability to retain patients until they complete treatment.
To the extent that these di¤erences re‡ect di¤erences in practice style or management tech-
niques, we conclude that Maine potentially could improve the cost e¤ectiveness of publicly
funded treatment substantially by identifying and transferring best practices.59
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Frequency of use parameters
cuto¤s error terms
lower upper standard deviation correlation
¡3:4309 0:7787 3:0049 0:5781
(0:1436) (0:1045) (0:0915) (0:0304)
Table 14: Estimated frequency of use model
A Appendix
A.1 Other estimated parameters
Our estimated model contains a large number of coe¢cients in addition to the estimated treatment
and population e¤ects discussed in the text. We begin with the frequency of use model, i.e. the
ordered probit model relating current health and frequency of alcohol use. Recall that we have
de…ned a categorical variable taking on three possible values to describe frequency of use. Thus,
we estimate two cut-o¤ values. We also estimate the joint distribution of the error terms.60 The
estimates are presented in Table 14.
According to the estimates, a patient is using alcohol at least once a day if hi0+´i < ¡3:4309,
and is abstinent if hi0 + ´i > 0:7787. A similar interpretation applies for frequency of use upon
completion, for which the relevant latent variable is ¹hi + ¹´i: The standard errors of the estimates
are in parentheses, and indicate that our estimates for this frequency of use model are reasonably
precise. The relatively large variances on the error terms (relative to the distance between the
cuto¤s) indicate signi…cant heterogeneity in the population of patients regarding the relationship
between health status and alcohol use. The fact that much of this variance is idiosyncratic (i.e. the
correlation coe¢cient between the error term at the start of treatment and the error term at the
60The coe¢cient on h is set to equal to unity. This normalization de…nes the units of our latent
variable determining frequency.
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end of treatment is only 0.58) suggests that the variable “reduction in frequency of use” may not,
by itself, be a very precise outcome measure for patients.
We next turn to the e¤ect of patient characteristics (X) on the treatment process. These
parameter estimates are collected in Table 15. Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns
present the estimated coe¢cients onXi in 1) initial health (h0), 2) the drift of the treatment process
(¹), 3) health at completion (h), 4) the probability of dropping out of treatment (¸), and 5) the
units equation (ln(u)). These coe¢cients require cautious interpretations, as they incorporate both
the direct e¤ect of the observable characteristic and an indirect e¤ect through the conditional mean
of the unobservable characteristic. The two e¤ects are not identi…ed separately. Recognizing this
ambiguity, the estimates have straightforward interpretations. For example, positive coe¢cients in
the ¹ equation indicate a better response to treatment. Positive coe¢cients in the equations for h0
and h also indicate that the patient consumes alcohol less frequently at admission and completion.
Positive coe¢cients in the equation for h and negatives coe¢cients in the equations for h0, ¹, and
¸ indicate that the patient is likely to remain in treatment longer.61
We include in patient characteristics the date of admission as well as quarterly dummies.62 The
admission date captures time trends in the data, while the quarterly dummies allow for seasonal
61More precisely h¡ho¹ is the mean time to completion, conditional on completion. Therefore the
e¤ect of a given variable x in the expected time to completion (conditional on completion) of the
average patient is given by the following expression:
d
³
h¡ho
¹
´
dx
=
d(h¡ho)
dx ¹¡ d¹dx
¡
h¡ ho
¢
¹2
where ¹ and
¡
h¡ ho
¢
take the values 0:1722 and 5: 3318 (= 5:9493¡0:6175) for the average patient
in the sample (see Table 8).
62In the estimation, all non-categorical variables are normalized to have mean zero and variance
one. For example, to convert the coe¢cients on admission date into coe¢cients on date measured
in days we need to divide by the standard deviation of the admission date variable, e.g. the time
trend in the drift equation is 0:0028394 ¼ 0:000007 per day.
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Variable Description h0 ¹ h ¸ ln(u)
Date of Admission
¡0:1677
(0:0493)
0:0028
(0:0041)
¡0:2307
(0:0676)
0:0429
(0:0242)
¡0:0458
(0:0122)
Males
¡0:1497
(0:1215)
¡0:0519
(0:0101)
¡0:1168
(0:1747)
0:1628
(0:0558)
¡0:0134
(0:0291)
Age
¡0:0288
(0:0481)
0:0041
(0:0036)
0:0715
(0:0623)
¡0:1660
(0:0280)
0:0619
(0:0113)
White
¡0:0508
(0:1255)
¡0:0336
(0:0204)
¡1:0415
(0:1416)
¡0:3077
(0:1514)
0:0913
(0:0796)
Married
¡0:0399
(0:1178)
0:0210
(0:0088)
0:2055
(0:1619)
0:0361
(0:0557)
¡0:0250
(0:0273)
Severity=Casual
0:9098
(0:1416)
0:0640
(0:0181)
¡0:1016
(0:1688)
¡0:6815
(0:1166)
0:0048
(0:0400)
Severity=Involved
0:2604
(0:1099)
0:0353
(0:0096)
0:1023
(0:1611)
¡0:3711
(0:0609)
0:0777
(0:0257)
Severity=Undetermined
0:0590
(0:1170)
0:0381
(0:0124)
¡0:3240
(0:1686)
¡0:1622
(0:0646)
¡0:0396
(0:0315)
Income if Stated
¡0:0900
(0:0518)
¡0:0024
(0:0040)
¡0:1838
(0:0741)
¡0:1140
(0:0288)
0:0364
(0:0130)
Income
undetermined
¡0:1452
(0:1275)
¡0:0189
(0:0107)
¡0:2266
(0:1901)
0:0755
(0:0695)
¡0:0350
(0:0344)
OSA Primary Payer
0:4966
(0:1384)
0:2095
(0:0184)
1:1723
(0:2027)
1:3428
(0:1379)
¡0:1163
(0:0721)
Self Primary Payer
0:1516
(0:1302)
0:2389
(0:0170)
0:5517
(0:1412)
1:3299
(0:1300)
¡0:2661
(0:0689)
Medicaid or Medicare
Primary Payer
0:0333
(0:1414)
0:1721
(0:0169)
1:2568
(0:1773)
1:1955
(0:1296)
0:0796
(0:0692)
Own Private Insurance
Primary Payer
¡0:0374
(0:1558)
0:2287
(0:0186)
0:7677
(0:1901)
1:1413
(0:1341)
¡0:0460
(0:0684)
Infrequent problems at
job at admission
¡1:7527
(0:1425)
0:0028
(0:0151)
¡1:3011
(0:2431)
0:2117
(0:1060)
¡0:0861
(0:0487)
Occasional problems at
job at admission
¡2:0174
(0:2344)
¡0:0137
(0:0290)
¡2:1575
(0:3101)
0:5577
(0:1523)
¡0:2716
(0:0719)
Frequent problems at
job at admission
¡3:0150
(0:3102)
¡0:0459
(0:0313)
¡2:7822
(0:3931)
0:5018
(0:1316)
¡0:1858
(0:0742)
Probation/Parole
or Furloughed
1:3614
(0:1210)
0:0405
(0:0112)
1:6964
(0:2038)
¡0:3913
(0:0617)
0:0884
(0:0273)
Drunk driving
0:8835
(0:1116)
0:1366
(0:0173)
0:7651
(0:1548)
¡1:2203
(0:0961)
0:2269
(0:0272)
Concurrent Psych-
iatric Problems
¡0:0429
(0:1356)
¡0:0505
(0:0119)
¡0:1383
(0:2320)
0:0842
(0:0721)
¡0:0080
(0:0422)
2nd Quarter
0:2002
(0:1122)
¡0:0136
(0:0105)
0:1224
(0:1636)
0:1208
(0:0666)
¡0:0315
(0:0356)
3rd Quarter
0:2525
(0:1113)
¡0:0021
(0:0093)
0:1058
(0:1614)
0:0807
(0:0718)
¡0:0049
(0:0323)
4thQuarter
0:2781
(0:1133)
¡0:0083
(0:0089)
0:2900
(0:1688)
0:2235
(0:0637)
¡0:1054
(0:0303)
Unemployed (and
not a student)
¡0:0733
(0:0956)
¡0:0027
(0:0085)
¡0:1299
(0:1809)
0:1580
(0:0480)
¡0:0445
(0:0249)
Unobserved
Characteristic
1
¡
¡0:0235
(0:0234)
¡0:8535
(0:0989)
¡0:9248
(0:1200)
0:2616
(0:0486)
Table 15: Coe¢cient estimates for patient characteristics (X). Bootstrap standard errors in
parentheses
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e¤ects. The time trend in ¹ is not signi…cantly di¤erent than zero over the sample period, perhaps
indicating that the improvement in the technology or an improvement in incentives to provide
e¤ective treatment was minor.63 Over time patients became more likely to drop out, and were less
likely to be abstinent at completion. For the most part, the quarterly e¤ects are not very signi…cant.
There is nothing particularly remarkable about the coe¢cients on the basic demographic vari-
ables. The sex of the patient matters, in that males, all else equal, respond worse to treatment and
are more likely to dropout of treatment prematurely. Married patients do better in treatment, and
older patients are less likely to dropout. Higher income patients are less likely to dropout and are
less likely to be abstinent upon completion. Patients who are unemployed at admission are more
likely to leave treatment prematurely.
Legal involvement matters signi…cantly. Patients on parole or pending trial, or in treatment
due to a drunk-driving o¤ense, respond better to treatment, are more likely to be abstinent upon
completion, and are less likely to drop out of treatment. These pluses could be due to the incentives
associated with their legal involvement. Payment source matters in various ways. Not surprisingly,
for example, patients paying out of pocket respond better to treatment than the others and receive
less units of treatment.
The initial severity of the substance abuse problem impacts the treatment process in several
ways. As expected, severity is a strong predictor of initial health. Dependent/dysfunctional alcohol
abusers (the omitted category) do not respond as well to treatment as casual or involved users. Pa-
tients who enter treatment with problems on the job related to alcohol abuse respond to treatment
63For the same increase in health, the point estimate of the time trend in the drift equation
implies that the average patient admitted in October 1992 would have completed treatment about
1.5 % faster if admitted a year later. OSA introduced “performance based contracting” over the
sample period, using the information collected in MATS in its budget allocation decisions. It is
possible that this change in information structure altered incentives. See Commons, McGuire and
Riordan (1997).
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¾ °3 °4 °5
0:7117
(0:0280)
¡0:0117
(0:0021)
0:8010
(0:2230)
0:8874
(0:0803)
Table 16: Other estimated Coe¢cients
similarly to other patients (no problems on the job is the omitted category), but are less likely to
be abstinent on completion and are more likely to exit treatment prematurely.
The last row of Table 15 contains estimated coe¢cients on the unobservable patient charac-
teristic "i. The coe¢cient is normalized to 1 for the hi0 equation (this de…nes the units health is
measured in). The unobserved patient characteristic is particularly important in the completion
threshold, dropout, and units equations.
Other miscellaneous coe¢cients estimated are the variance of the Wiener process and the time
dependent coe¢cients in the attrition model. These are reported in Table 16. Attrition, for
example, is discretely higher in the …rst week and nearly constant thereafter, as we expected from
the sample attrition histogram in Figure 3.
A.2 Estimated productivities for other patient populations
Table 17 reports productivities for every patient population in every agency using health as the
output measure and controlling for both unobservable and observable characteristics of patient
populations.
A.3 Abstinence as an output measure
An alternative measure of output is the expected number of discharged abstinent patients in a
treated population. To compute this quantity, we determine distributions of …nal health status for
62
AGENCY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
All
10:96
(0:84)
14:95
(1:35)
9:33
(0:90)
8:36
(1:05)
8:45
(1:22)
8:71
(0:89)
8:09
(0:54)
7:55
(0:54)
6:27
(0:85)
5:67
(0:75)
10:17
(1:56)
8:17
(0:94)
6:61
(0:69)
7:59
(1:05)
7:87
(1:32)
1
12:87
(0:90)
16:74
(1:69)
9:35
(1:29)
9:97
(1:30)
10:73
(1:87)
9:75
(1:21)
8:81
(0:78)
8:32
(0:76)
7:75
(1:03)
7:23
(0:87)
10:17
(2:07)
9:68
(1:14)
7:13
(0:86)
8:52
(1:22)
7:92
(1:83)
P 2
9:07
(1:08)
12:08
(1:48)
5:80
(1:27)
6:20
(1:56)
5:09
(2:09)
4:62
(1:29)
4:26
(0:98)
4:24
(0:90)
4:25
(1:34)
3:94
(0:94)
4:47
(2:22)
3:89
(1:37)
3:21
(1:05)
3:19
(1:49)
2:35
(1:98)
O 3
8:03
(1:13)
12:16
(1:38)
8:38
(0:59)
5:75
(1:05)
5:10
(1:14)
6:41
(0:92)
6:23
(0:74)
5:86
(0:70)
3:88
(0:96)
3:30
(0:89)
8:87
(1:19)
5:30
(1:32)
5:35
(0:78)
5:63
(1:17)
6:72
(0:94)
P 4
12:43
(1:10)
16:03
(1:85)
8:75
(1:49)
9:45
(1:52)
9:75
(1:99)
8:87
(1:55)
8:03
(1:03)
7:59
(1:06)
7:24
(1:19)
6:76
(0:93)
9:12
(2:34)
8:66
(1:51)
6:36
(1:07)
7:49
(1:45)
6:84
(2:06)
U 5
13:29
(1:36)
17:93
(1:92)
11:94
(1:29)
10:47
(1:42)
10:94
(1:45)
11:43
(1:53)
10:60
(1:00)
9:74
(0:99)
8:01
(1:15)
7:22
(1:08)
13:37
(2:19)
10:87
(1:39)
8:59
(0:95)
10:05
(1:48)
10:61
(1:78)
L 6
10:66
(1:04)
14:93
(1:48)
10:10
(0:84)
8:17
(1:09)
8:06
(1:19)
9:10
(0:65)
8:57
(0:65)
7:87
(0:67)
6:04
(0:97)
5:35
(0:99)
11:29
(1:34)
8:33
(1:18)
7:02
(0:73)
7:98
(1:19)
8:85
(1:18)
A 7
12:29
(0:87)
16:34
(1:51)
10:14
(1:05)
9:66
(1:12)
10:21
(1:35)
10:20
(1:03)
9:34
(0:59)
8:67
(0:63)
7:47
(0:88)
6:82
(0:76)
11:38
(1:74)
9:92
(0:99)
7:56
(0:72)
8:98
(1:07)
9:01
(1:47)
T 8
11:53
(0:97)
15:50
(1:49)
9:56
(0:97)
8:87
(1:19)
8:92
(1:45)
9:21
(1:06)
8:51
(0:70)
7:90
(0:53)
6:70
(0:96)
6:08
(0:84)
10:44
(1:72)
8:74
(1:06)
6:83
(0:79)
7:94
(1:15)
8:04
(1:50)
I 9
14:22
(1:23)
17:89
(2:30)
9:31
(1:71)
11:09
(1:52)
12:56
(2:33)
10:36
(1:64)
9:21
(1:16)
8:79
(1:17)
8:84
(1:14)
8:43
(0:93)
10:13
(2:58)
10:66
(1:51)
7:44
(1:17)
9:11
(1:52)
7:95
(2:29)
O 10
12:28
(1:13)
15:23
(2:15)
7:46
(1:56)
9:38
(1:46)
10:26
(2:54)
8:26
(1:63)
7:31
(1:09)
7:02
(1:09)
7:40
(1:14)
7:12
(0:73)
7:76
(2:38)
8:46
(1:45)
5:78
(1:08)
7:03
(1:51)
5:84
(2:14)
N 11
7:96
(1:42)
12:18
(1:74)
9:22
(0:92)
5:83
(1:23)
5:29
(1:45)
7:04
(1:38)
6:90
(1:02)
6:35
(0:98)
3:98
(1:12)
3:35
(1:10)
10:30
(1:25)
5:85
(1:60)
5:95
(0:90)
6:33
(1:35)
8:15
(1:13)
12
13:01
(1:10)
17:25
(1:71)
10:14
(1:26)
10:09
(1:32)
10:84
(1:55)
10:19
(1:25)
9:29
(0:81)
8:75
(0:81)
7:78
(1:04)
7:18
(0:92)
11:08
(2:10)
9:96
(0:94)
7:60
(0:85)
8:99
(1:29)
8:69
(1:77)
13
10:71
(0:99)
14:24
(1:54)
8:36
(1:15)
8:00
(1:35)
7:65
(1:64)
7:71
(1:24)
7:13
(0:80)
6:67
(0:80)
5:91
(1:06)
5:40
(0:90)
8:57
(1:92)
7:13
(1:13)
5:62
(0:81)
6:35
(1:24)
6:28
(1:66)
14
12:84
(1:04)
16:74
(1:65)
9:64
(1:20)
10:04
(1:25)
10:81
(1:70)
10:09
(1:12)
9:14
(0:74)
8:58
(0:71)
7:83
(1:07)
7:26
(0:89)
10:68
(1:97)
10:03
(1:09)
7:39
(0:82)
8:87
(1:23)
8:40
(1:70)
15
6:99
(1:14)
11:04
(1:60)
8:15
(0:90)
4:87
(1:03)
4:15
(1:14)
5:63
(1:10)
5:61
(0:85)
5:28
(0:88)
3:14
(0:90)
2:60
(0:87)
8:66
(1:28)
4:38
(1:35)
4:98
(0:77)
5:04
(1:22)
6:69
(0:78)
Table 17: Estimated Productivities in terms of health
each individual in the population. More precisely, for a given …nal health status, we compute the
probability of abstinence conditional on this health status. For completors this is fairly easy, as we
estimate the completion threshold, bhij. For dropouts the calculation is a bit harder because there is
a probability distribution over the …nal health status of patients. To compute expected abstinence,
we simulate from this distribution and average the abstinence probability over the simulation draws.
Table 18 reproduces the productivity comparisons of Table 11 using abstinence, instead of ag-
gregate health improvement, as the measure of output. The productivity rankings using abstinence
appear very di¤erent. In fact, the correlation coe¢cient between the two sets of productivities is
only 0.31.64 As the productivity numbers in this table are literally the number of abstinent patients
per dollar spent, it appears that the agencies in Maine are producing between 2.5 and 5.0 abstinent
64The low correlation between productivities using health improvement and abstinence reported in
Tables 11 and 18 may be related to the di¤erent assumptions involved regarding the counterfactuals.
Assuming that untreated patient receive no health improvement may be a dramatically di¤erent
assumption than assuming that they are all non-abstinent. However, the following policy analyses
show that conclusions regarding good and poor performing agencies are fairly insensitive to the
output measure used.
63
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Figure 8: Expected number of abstinent patients versus costs
patients per $1000. This calculation leaves aside the question of how many of these patients would
have been abstinent in the absence of any treatment.
Figure 8 repeats the analysis of Figure 7 using abstinence at discharge, rather than health
improvement, as the relevant measure of output. The results are similar. In this case, the
agencies that are potentially on the e¢ciency frontier are Agencies 2, 4, 5, 6, and 12. Agencies 13
and 10 still appear to be very ine¢cient.
Using bootstrap methods, we test as before whether an agency is on the e¢ciency frontier.
Table 19 reports results for both abstinence and health improvement. Using abstinence as the
output measure, Agencies 3, 8, 10, 13, and 15 can be rejected as e¢cient with 95% con…dence, 9
and 14 can be rejected with 90% con…dence. It seems clear that regardless of the outcome variable
64
Own population
Entire population
NOT accounting for pop. e¤.
Entire population
accounting for pop. e¤.
Agency product. ranking product. ranking product. ranking
1
0:0036
(0:0002)
8
0:0034
(0:0001)
8
0:0030
(0:0002)
10
2
0:0032
(0:0004)
9
0:0031
(0:0003)
11
0:0031
(0:0003)
8
3
0:0024
(0:0001)
14
0:0023
(0:0001)
15
0:0029
(0:0002)
12
4
0:0036
(0:0004)
7
0:0036
(0:0003)
6
0:0031
(0:0003)
9
5
0:0037
(0:0005)
5
0:0039
(0:0003)
4
0:0036
(0:0004)
5
6
0:0039
(0:0002)
2
0:0039
(0:0002)
3
0:0042
(0:0002)
2
7
0:0038
(0:0002)
3
0:0039
(0:0001)
2
0:0037
(0:0002)
4
8
0:0030
(0:0001)
12
0:0030
(0:0001)
12
0:0030
(0:0001)
11
9
0:0037
(0:0004)
6
0:0035
(0:0003)
7
0:0028
(0:0003)
13
10
0:0031
(0:0002)
11
0:0032
(0:0002)
10
0:0025
(0:0002)
14
11
0:0032
(0:0003)
10
0:0032
(0:0002)
9
0:0040
(0:0004)
3
12
0:0050
(0:0004)
1
0:0048
(0:0003)
1
0:0045
(0:0004)
1
13
0:0024
(0:0002)
15
0:0026
(0:0002)
13
0:0024
(0:0002)
15
14
0:0038
(0:0003)
4
0:0037
(0:0002)
5
0:0034
(0:0003)
6
15
0:0025
(0:0002)
13
0:0025
(0:0002)
14
0:0032
(0:0003)
7
Table 18: Agency productivity rankings using abstinence as an output measure
65
Abstinence Health improvement
Agency Estimate Probability Estimate Probability
1 0 0.747 0 0.468
2 1 0.883 1 1.000*
3 0 0.026* 0 0.169
4 1 0.390 1 0.201
5 1 0.546 0 0.442
6 1 0.760 1 0.708
7 0 0.429 0 0.299
8 0 0.039* 0 0.039*
9 0 0.078 0 0.000*
10 0 0.013* 0 0.000*
11 0 0.383 1 0.870
12 1 0.870 1 0.740
13 0 0.000* 0 0.000*
14 0 0.0649 0 0.117
15 0 0.007* 0 0.130
Table 19: Statistical tests of being on the e¢ciency frontier in terms of abstinence
used, Agencies 8, 9, 10 and 13 are underperformers.
A.4 Substance abuse treatment literature
We discuss how our work relates to the literature on substance abuse treatment. The received
literature focuses on four questions: Is treatment e¤ective? Are all treatment programs equally
e¤ective? Why do programs di¤er in their e¤ectiveness? Which treatments are more cost e¤ective?
A.4.1 Is treatment e¤ective?
This question begs for a de…nition of e¤ectiveness. McLellan et al. (1997) identi…es three dimen-
sions of e¤ectiveness: 1) reduction of alcohol or drug use; 2) improvement in personal and social
functioning; and 3) improvements in public health, and conclude that the weight of the evidence
supports the conclusion that treatment is e¤ective in each dimension. Our study does not directly
66
address the e¤ectiveness of treatment because our sample does not include alcohol abusers who do
not receive treatment. However, our conclusion that some programs are more e¤ective at reducing
alcohol use than others (Table 6) certainly does suggest that the treatment provided by the better
agencies is e¤ective. To think that treatment is ine¤ective would seem to require a conclusion that
the treatment provided by the other agencies is counterproductive.
Recent research views substance abuse treatment as a multi-product activity. Accordingly,
McLellan et al. (1980) has proposed an Addiction Severity Index (ASI) composed of seven distinct
categories of outcome measures: employment; medical status; alcohol use; drug use; legal status;
family and social relationships and psychiatric symptoms.65 Recognizing this perspective, OSA
designed MATS in order to recover multiple outcomes to evaluate programs (i.e. abstinence, re-
duction in use, employability, job improvement, problems at job/school, problems with signi…cant
other/family, problems with the law and the judicial system, etc.).66
A strength of our methodology is that it utilizes the information contained in multiple outcome
measures to estimate a production process and compare productivities. In addition to reduction
65The interdependence of these di¤erent categories of health improvement is still not well un-
derstood. For example Ja¤e (1984) discusses the independence of these indicators in the short
run, while Moos, Finney and Cronkite (1990) found that improvements in any one category are
correlated with improvements in the other categories.
66MATS data is based on agency assessments of patients at admission and discharge from treat-
ment. Some of this data are therefore self-reported measures. MATS data was collected in order
to implement performance based contracting (PBC). Lu (1999) argued that agencies changed re-
porting practices after the introduction of PBC in …scal year 1993. The broader substance abuse
treatment literature has also questioned the reliability of self-reported data (e.g. McLellan et al
(1997), Ball and Ross (1991), Long et al. (1998), Butler et. al (1987), Moos, Finney and Cronkite
(1990), Maitso et. al (1990), Aitken (1986), Aplser and Harding 1991)). We would not expect
this to be a problem if reporting biases in our outcome variables were not correlated with agency
assignments.
The timing of measurement of our variables is also potentially problematic. MATS measures vari-
ables at admission into treatment and at discharge. Aplser and Harding (1991) criticize measures
at discharge because they may not re‡ect the long lasting e¤ects of treatment. On the other hand
a long follow-up period has the problem of distinguishing between the e¤ects of several treatment
episodes. They also argue that measurement at admission time may be biased because of the “hit
the bottom” e¤ect, but this criticism only matters for our study if this e¤ect varies across agencies.
67
in use,67 our approach gives weight to treatment outcomes which OSA did not highlight, includ-
ing time in treatment, and discharge status. We postulate an underlying latent measure of a
patient’s health, and view multiple outcome measures as containing di¤erent information about
improvements in a patient’s underlying health. In contrast to the ASI, which gives …xed weights
to clinically important outcome measures, our structural model implicitly weights the importance
of these measures according to their information content as revealed by the data.
Moreover, in principle we could extend our methodology to include additional outcome measures
contained in our data set that we have not exploited yet. For example, our study includes “problems
on the job” at admission as a patient characteristic (included in X). We could also use discharge
data to include reductions in problems on the job as an outcome measure similarly to how we
analyze reduction in frequency of use. Presumably this extension would increase the accuracy
of our estimates or allow a richer model, although these gains would come at a cost of greater
computational complexity.68
A.4.2 Are all treatment programs equally e¤ective?
The relative performance of substance abuse treatment programs is controversial. Emrick (1975)
argues that the literature does not support the conclusion that programs are di¤erent in their per-
formance. However, the more recent literature repeatedly observes that substance abuse treatment
programs di¤er in their e¤ectiveness (McLellan et al. (1997), McLellan et al. (1993), Ball and Ross
(1991), Anglin and Hser (1990) among others). For example, McLellan et al. (1993) …nd signi…cant
di¤erences in the nature and e¤ectiveness of treatments for four otherwise similar private programs,
67We consider frequency of use information at discharge only for patients who complete treatment.
At the cost of some computational complexity, we could also consider frequency of use data for
patients who leave treatment prematurely.
68See foonotes 10, 11 and 12.
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and suggest that such di¤erences are likely to be even more pronounced for publicly funded pro-
grams with unstable funding. Our comparison of the …fteen largest publicly funded outpatient
programs in Maine con…rms that the performance of these agencies di¤er even after controlling for
observable and unobservable patient population characteristics (Table 17).69
A.4.3 Why do programs di¤er?
Some recent work in the substance abuse treatment literature tries to open the “black box” of
treatment and identify its “active ingredients” (McLellan et al. (1993), McLellan et al. (1998),
Ball and Ross (1991), Finney et. al (1996), Moos, Finney and Cronkite (1990)). In contrast, most of
the “black box” literature relies on patient characteristics as the main predictors of di¤erences across
programs. Characteristics such as less severity of dependence, intact marriage, lower psychiatric
symptoms, job, less family problems, minimal criminal activity, are associated with better outcomes
(McLellan et al. (1997), Apsler and Harding (1991), Anglin and Hser (1990)). Our results conform
with this literature in that we control extensively for patient characteristics. However, we go further
and identify agency …xed e¤ects as an important determinant of treatment e¤ectiveness.
In their search for the active ingredients of treatment, researchers devoted themselves to the
acquisition of very detailed data sets with information on all aspects of the treatment scenario.
69Our treatment of unobserved characteristics solves a sample selection problem inherent in non-
randomized data, i.e. di¤erent agencies having populations with di¤erent unobservable charac-
teristics. Sample selection problems are intrinsic to …eld studies, and a failure to deal with this
adequately is often the basis of criticism (e.g. McClellan (1997)): In the context of our setting,
Shen (1998) argued that the introduction of performance based contracting induced agencies to
admit patients more selectively. Of course, even randomized trials can su¤er from sample selection
problems (e.g. Heckman and Smith (1995); Strohmetz, Alterman and Walter (1990)). Patient
attrition creates a second selection problem in our data, we deal with it by explicitly modelling
a patient attrition process. The received literature has also recognized the importance of patient
attrition in evaluating outcomes (e.g. Apsler and Harding (1991), Anglin and Hser (1990), Ball
and Ross (1991), Gerstein and Hardwood (1990)).
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Ball and Ross (1991) exhaustive study of six methadone treatment programs, found that leader-
ship, organization, sta¢ng patterns, amount of services to patients were among the variables that
accounted for a signi…cant proportion of the variance across programs. Similarly, Joe, Simpson and
Sells (1994) found evidence that both the type of the admission sta¤ and the sta¤ responsible for
the treatment plan mattered for the patient relapse rates. Moos, Finney and Cronkite (1990) con-
sider subjective indicators of treatment quality from patients and sta¤ that measure variables such
as support, relationship between sta¤ and patients, organization of the program, etc. Our agency
…xed e¤ects can be interpreted as capturing these di¤erences. Our conclusion that superior per-
formance is idiosyncratic is consistent with Ball and Ross’ (1991) statement regarding Methadone
treatment programs: “Each clinic develops its own philosophy of treatment which appears to be
strongly conditioned by the director’s personal philosophy,” which they found was important to
explain some di¤erences in performance.
The type and quantity of treatment services have been associated with di¤erences in outcomes
across programs (McLellan et al. (1993), McLellan et al (JAMA 1993)). For example, Moos,
Finney and Cronkite (1990) use treatment intensity as an explanatory variable of outcomes in their
analysis of …ve residential programs for alcoholics.70 Lu and McGuire (2001), using a di¤erent
sample of MATS data, found a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of more units of treatment for the
more severe substance abusers although this e¤ect disappears when they control for the interaction
of “units of treatment” and “time in treatment.”71 Time in treatment is sometimes used as a proxy
70See also Finney, Hanh and Moos (1996) where they review the studies comparing outpatient
and inpatient programs (which di¤er in intensity), and Walsh et al. (1991) interesting study based
on randomized clinical trials where patients are assigned to three treatment modalities varying in
treatment intensity.
71Other studies worth mentioning but where causality cannot be established due to endogeneity
are: Moos, Finney and Cronkite (1990) who show an association between higher participation in
some treatment components such as therapy sessions, AA meetings, …lms, attendance to church
services, etc. and outcomes; and Ball and Ross (1991) who arrive to similar conclusions.
70
for services received under the assumption that longer stays yield a higher exposure to treatment
(Apsler 1991). The literature shows that patients who stay longer in treatment tend to do better
(McLellan et al. (1997), Longabaugh (1983), IOM report (1990), Tims et al. (1991), Ball and
Ross (1991), Moos, Finney and Cronkite (1990).72) Not all of the literature recognizes that time
in treatment is potentially endogenous in the sense that more di¢cult patients might dropout of
treatment earlier (McLellan et al., 1997).73 Our analysis endogenizes time in treatment and patient
attrition within a structural model of the treatment process.
We do not have data on an individual patient’s time path of treatment. However, we do
know the number of units of treatment provided in each treatment episode from which we can
compute the (average) intensity of treatment. A good direction for further research is to extend
our structural model by adding an equation that predicts intensity of treatment.74 We expect that
treatment intensity will impact the drift and may, in part, explain some of the observed di¤erences
in productivity across agencies.
A.4.4 Which treatments are more cost e¤ective?
Cost-e¤ectiveness analyses of substance abuse treatment are fewer than treatment e¤ectiveness
studies. Most studies on cost-e¤ectiveness compare alternative treatment modalities (e.g. inpatient
vs. outpatient). Walsh et al. (1991), for example, …nd that the ultimate treatment costs for
alcoholic patients receiving an initial three weeks of inpatient therapy followed by participation
72There is a new trend analysing the e¤ects of “brief interventions” for alcoholics and a number
of studies claim their e¤ectiveness as compared with longer treatment. Drummond (1997) criticizes
this new literature on the basis of sample selection.
73An exception is French et al. (1991) who control for unobserved patient heterogeneity in their
study of the impact of time in treatment on labor market outcomes at a one year follow-up.
74The dependence of average intensity on time in treatment allows for variable actual intensity
over a treatment episode. For example, patients might be more likely to miss appointments as time
goes on.
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in an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) group was only 10% more than for a comparison AA group
not receiving the initial inpatient treatment and performed somewhat better. Longabaugh et al.
(1983) showed that a partial hospital setting was substantially less costly than an extended inpatient
setting with no signi…cant di¤erences in performance. Long et al. (1998) compared a …ve week
inpatient program with a two week program followed by daily outpatient therapy concluding that
the shorter program reduced costs by 33% with no signi…cant di¤erence in outcomes six to twelve
months later.75 Our study focuses solely on outpatient services and …nds signi…cant di¤erences in
cost-e¤ectiveness of treatment agencies. We do not explore explicitly whether these di¤erences are
due to di¤erences in program design76, or due to di¤erences in e¢ciency (e.g selection of better
clinicians.) This is a good topic for further research.
Machado (2001), using aggregate MATS data, found that agencies that spent more per patient
did not have better abstinence rates at discharge,77 suggesting that Maine could reduce expenditures
on publicly funded substance abuse treatment without compromising performance. Our more
detailed study of cost-e¤ectiveness, using patient-level data, supports this suggestion and develops
a methodology for benchmarking treatment agencies and identifying which are more cost e¤ective.
We conclude that Maine potentially could reduce spending on alcohol abuse treatment without
compromising the health outcomes of patients by identifying and transferring best practices (Tables
1 and 12).
75The data came from a facility that revamped its program. The authors caution that the
performance results could be due to better sta¤ motivation in the revised program with a shorter
inpatient stay.
76Treatment agencies provide di¤erent kinds of outpatient services. In this paper we weight
“family therapy,” “individual sessions” and “group sessions” according to their relative unit costs.
This approach implicitly allows group therapy to be more e¤ective than individual therapy.
77Machado (1998) expands her regression model to allow for heterogeneity in the use of funds
across agencies and …nds evidence that OSA could gain by reallocating funds to at least one agency.
Her results, however, are not very powerful due to data aggregation and few observations per agency.
